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ABSTRACT 
From an event management standpoint, and in concert with digital mapping applications, 
satellite imagery has proven its utility to support first responders and emergency services 
in a wide range of both natural and manmade disasters.  Imagery data has also 
supplemented police activities in developing operational plans that can be prepared for 
short time, high risk responses at either public facilities or events. 
This policy options analysis draws a side-by-side comparison of three approaches 
for the law enforcement community to readily acquire satellite imagery.  One approach 
will make added use of the Civil Applications Committee, the second approach will 
explore the reactivation of the National Applications Office, and the third will investigate 
making greater use of commercially available sources. All three approaches have clear 
advantages and disadvantages, some more than others. 
In the final analysis, the best policy option presented was making greater use of 
commercial providers.  The relative ease to collect material and manage it with fewer 
obstacles, in comparison to the Civil Applications Committee and National Applications 
Office alternative, made it the better option. 
 
 v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT .............................................................................1 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .............................................................................3 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH .......................................................3 
D. CHAPTER BREAKDOWN ............................................................................4 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................................5 
A. APPLICATIONS AND SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY ....................................5 
B. FORMER AND EXISTING PROGRAMS ...................................................7 
C. THE LAW.........................................................................................................8 
D. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................9 
III. BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION .....................................................................11 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................11 
B. SATELLITE IMAGERY IN ITS PRIMACY .............................................12 
1. Early and Current Military Satellite Programs ..............................12 
2. U.S. Civilian and Commercial Satellite Programs ..........................16 
C. SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY .....................................................................21 
D. CIVILIAN AND LAW ENFORCEMENT APPLICATION .....................26 
E. ORGANIZATIONS THAT EXIST OR HAVE EXISTED ........................32 
1. The Civil Applications Committee ...................................................32 
2. The DHS National Applications Office ............................................35 
F. DISCUSSION SUMMARY ...........................................................................37 
IV. THE LAW...................................................................................................................39 
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ...................................................................39 
B. THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 ...45 
C. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................50 
V. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH ANALYSIS ..............................................53 
A. METHODOLOGY APPROACH .................................................................54 
B. POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS ..................................................................56 
1. Policy Options.....................................................................................56 
a. Policy Option 1: Further Supplement the CAC to Support 
LE ............................................................................................57 
b. Option 2: Reestablish the National Applications Office .......58 
c. Policy Option 3: Make Greater use of Commercial 
Providers ..................................................................................59 
2. Policy Options Grading Criteria ......................................................60 
a. Legislative Support ..................................................................60 
b. Legal Issues .............................................................................60 
c. Projected Cost ..........................................................................60 
d. Ease to Implement ...................................................................61 
C. POLICY OPTIONS EVALUATION ...........................................................61 
 vii 
1. Policy Option 1: Further Supplement the Civil Applications 
Committee Evaluation .......................................................................61 
a. Policy Option 1: Legislative Support ......................................61 
b. Policy Option 1: Legal Issues .................................................62 
c. Policy Option 1: Projected Cost ..............................................62 
d. Policy Option 1: Ease to Implement .......................................68 
2. Policy Option 2: Reestablish the National Applications Office 
Evaluation ...........................................................................................68 
a. Policy Option 2: Legislative Support ......................................69 
b. Policy Option 2: Legal Issues .................................................70 
c. Policy Option 2: Projected Cost ..............................................71 
d. Policy Option 2: Ease to Implement .......................................73 
3. Policy Option 3: Make Greater use of Commercial Providers 
Evaluation ...........................................................................................74 
a. Policy Option 3: Legislative Support ......................................74 
b. Policy Option 3: Legal Issues .................................................74 
c. Policy Option 3: Projected Cost ..............................................75 
d. Policy Option 3: Ease to Implement .......................................78 
D. POLICY OPTIONS ASSESSMENT............................................................78 
1. Policy Option 1 Assessment: Further Supplement the CAC to 
Support LE .........................................................................................78 
2. Policy Option 2 Assessment: Reestablish the National 
Applications Office.............................................................................80 
3. Policy Option Three Assessment: Make Greater use of 
Commercial Assets .............................................................................82 
E. POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ......83 
VI. CONCLUSION AND LESSONS LEARNED .........................................................87 
A. LE ACCESS TO IMAGERY RESOURCES ..............................................87 
1. The CAC and LE ...............................................................................87 
2. The NAO, LE, and Public Opinion ..................................................88 
3. Commercial Providers .......................................................................89 
B. ADHERENCE TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW .........................................90 
1. Retooling the Fourth Amendment ....................................................90 
2. Expectation to Reasonable Privacy and the Public Place ..............91 
C. ASSUAGING THE PUBLIC ........................................................................92 
1. Transparency as a Solution ...............................................................92 
D. LEARNING FROM OTHERS TO EXPLORE AND IMPLEMENT A 
NOTIONAL APPROACH ............................................................................93 
E. WHAT WORKS.............................................................................................95 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................97 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................105 
 
 viii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. KH1 to KH-9 Film Recovery ...........................................................................13 
Figure 2. Landsat Comparisons of the Dead Sea ............................................................18 
Figure 3. Mys Shmidta Air Field Russia, 1960 Corona (L) and 2010 GeoEye (R) ........20 
Figure 4. Steps of Remote Sensing .................................................................................23 
Figure 5. Earth Coverage.................................................................................................24 
Figure 6. Commercial System Resolution Comparison ..................................................25 
Figure 7. Orbital Swath Width ........................................................................................26 
Figure 8. Hurricane Sandy Pre and Post..........................................................................28 
Figure 9. Yosemite Park Fire, August 26, 2013 ..............................................................28 
Figure 10. Before and After September 11, 2001, at 1 Meter Resolution .........................29 
Figure 11. Oblique Satellite Image of School (Top) with 3D Enhancement (Bottom) .....32 
Figure 12. USGS National Map Downloader and Viewer ................................................34 
Figure 13. Future NASA/NOAA Missions Anticipated ...................................................67 
Figure 14. Google Earth ....................................................................................................76 
Figure 15. Sample Cost for Custom Imagery Request ......................................................77 
 
 ix 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 x 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Policy Options Grading Criteria Summary ......................................................84 
Table 2. Policy Options Total Grade Summary .............................................................85 
 
 xi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACLU American Civil Liberties Union 
AIAA American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
ASC Advanced Systems Center 
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control Systems 
CAC Civil Applications Committee 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CRS Congressional Research Service 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DNI Director of National Intelligence 
DoD Department of Defense 
EO Executive Order 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
GAO General Accounting Office 
GEO Geosynchronous Orbit 
GFP Global Fiducials Program   
GIS Geographic Information System 
IC Intelligence Community 
IFOV Instantaneous Field of View 
IFTN Imagery for the Nation  
LE Law Enforcement 
LEO Low Earth Orbit 
KH Key Hole 
NAO National Applications Office 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NDSI National Spatial Data Infrastructure 
NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NRO National Reconnaissance Office 
NSGIC National States Geographic Information Council 
 xiii 
NSSE National Special Security Event 
PCA Posse Comitatus Act 
RFI Request for Information 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
UAS Unmanned Aircraft System 
UAV Unmanned Arial Vehicle 
USCS United States Customs Service 
USDA United States of Agriculture 




The use of satellite reconnaissance for space borne observation is not a unique function to 
the mission of surveillance in a domestic applications context.  As early as the 1960s 
national assets, to use a euphemism for military or intelligence community owned 
satellites, have been regularly used by an array of civilian agencies for scientific, 
mapping, environmental, disaster prediction and monitoring, and a host of other 
conventional non-military applications. 
The law enforcement (LE) community is a proponent to any technology that 
enhances its mission of upholding the laws of the land, legal investigation, and 
evidentiary collection.  With advancements in surveillance techniques, modern policing 
have been relegated to a science unto itself.  What was traditionally conducted in a 
surveillance covey within close proximity to a potential perpetrator, may today involve a 
greater standoff that necessitate a greater array of collection tools and methods.  
However, with a new array of technology comes new policy on its justified use and 
application, as well as an accompanying set of legal questions. 
Despite the warranted concerns, the utility of satellite imagery is apparent. In 
addition, further research is justified to investigate the feasibility of integrating and 
establishing advanced services, both government and commercial, for domestic law 
enforcement support and investigation.  A key question to ask: in coordination with the 
military and intelligence community, as well as other government agencies, is there a 
mechanism that can provide LE with greater access to national asset products, or is there 
a suitable alternative in the form of commercial providers? 
There exist, in present and past programs, multiple options that can be explored 
where lessons learned and mistakes encountered have occurred.  This analysis 
investigated three policy options that could support LE operations: one, an existing 
federal program, the second is a former federal program, and the third is a 
nongovernment owned activity.  Option one consists of supplementing the Civil 
Applications Committee to further support LE. Option two consists of reestablishing the 
 xv 
now defunct National Applications Office. Finally, option three consists of altogether 
eliminating government support, with the exception of disaster management, and having 
the duty of imagery collection through commercial providers managed at the lowest LE 
level. 
The policy options choices were graded using the following criteria: 1 legislative 
support, 2 legal issues, 3 projected cost, and 4 ease to implement.  Legislative support 
would gauge the likely confidence that enable the program to secure funding and sustain 
the program option.  Legal issues identifies whether a suggested policy option solution 
would garner questionable or excessive legal scrutiny.  Project cost anticipates the level 
of resources that will be necessary to enact the policy option.  Ease to implement 
identifies the level of ease to enact the policy option.  During the policy analysis 
assessment each of the four policy option grading criteria was assigned a rating of 
positive, neutral, or negative. 
This thesis determined that the best policy option was option three, which was the 
least complex.  Though there will always be an inherent distrust to any surveillance 
program, no matter its origin, in contrast to established government activities, LE would 
likely benefit far greater using commercial imagery providers.  The relative ease to 
collect material with minimal obstacles is a clear benefit to its use.  Though adherence to 
constitutional tenets is sacrosanct to any surveillance collection effort, being exempt from 
the Posse Comitatus Act and Executive Order 12333 would be another significant 
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Hicks: Can you get a feature scan and pattern matching on him? 
Van: No, he’s smart, he never looks up.  
Jones: Why does he have to look up?  
Fiedler: The satellite is 155 miles above the Earth.  It can only look 
straight down.  
Jones: That’s a bit limited, isn’t it?  
Van [Sarcastically]: well, maybe you should design a better one.  
Jones: Maybe I will, idiot. 
1998 film Enemy of the State 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The use of satellite reconnaissance for space-borne observation is not a unique 
function to the mission of surveillance in a domestic applications context.  As early as the 
1960s,1 national assets, a euphemism for military or Intelligence Community (IC) owned 
satellites, have been regularly used by an array of civilian agencies for scientific, 
mapping, environmental, disaster prediction and monitoring, and a host of other 
conventional non-military applications.    
Law enforcement (LE) is readily using satellite resources for a myriad of 
purposes. In order to ensure operational and emergency readiness, prepared activities 
have used this information to provide a better understanding of the communities that fall 
under its jurisdiction.  Data for emergency planning can be drawn by using basic imagery 
services that are available free on the Internet or, if need be, acquired at cost through 
commercial or government services that can provide greater optical resolution and sensor 
requirements.  
The LE community is a proponent of any technology that enhances its mission of 
upholding the laws of the land, legal investigation, and evidentiary collection.  With 
1 United States General Accounting Office, National Applications Office Certification Review 
(Washington, DC: United States Government Accounting Office, 2008, 1, accessed May 14, 2013, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/95855.pdf. 
1 
advancements in surveillance techniques, modern policing has been become to a science 
unto itself.  What was traditionally conducted in a surveillance covey, within close 
proximity to a potential perpetrator, may today involve a greater standoff that 
necessitates a greater array of collection tools and methods.  However, with a new array 
of technology comes new policy on its justified use, application, and an 
accompanying set of legal questions. 
Technology is the easy part; nevertheless, for the intention of government 
enquiry, especially for LE, a series of legal considerations arise.  Even against known 
criminals, the issue is wrought with privacy and civil liberty concerns from all levels of 
the law including: 1) constitutional rights, 2) statutory authorities and restrictions, and 3) 
executive branch authorities.   
When properly employed LE surveillance, even satellite, is very legal; all the 
same, the constitutional law of the land and all its derivative statutes are sacrosanct to 
American society where most policy makers and the general public may wish to wane on 
the notion of “better to be safe than sorry.”  
From a disaster perspective, satellite imagery, in combination with geographic 
information systems (GIS) (or digital mapping applications), is a vital tool to develop 
first responder disaster and operational contingency plans. Without it, the ability to 
effectively fight hurricanes, wild fires, industrial accidents, or handle similar events, 
would be greatly hampered.  In any short time, high risk LE action, specifically a 
standoff, hostage, or comparable scenario, the availability of this data to provide 
information, such as potential obstacles, points of ingress and egress, and urban specifics, 
is paramount in identifying details relating to an operating area and subsequent response.   
Despite the warranted concerns, the utility of satellite imagery is apparent, and 
further research is justified to investigate the feasibility of integrating and establishing 
advanced services, both government and commercial, for domestic law enforcement 
support and investigation.   
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In coordination with the military and intelligence community, as well as other 
government agencies, is there a mechanism that can provide LE with greater access to 
national asset products, or a suitable alternative in the form of commercial providers?  
Can this activity be conducted while adhering to and addressing constitutional law and 
likely privacy concerns?  Is there a mechanism or approach for assuaging the American 
public’s to this type of surveillance; would a level of transparency work? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
An ample amount of open source imagery data through many vectors is available 
to peruse.  From one standpoint, it is completely rational for an individual to query 
Google Earth occasionally. Most individuals today who have purchased real estate, 
whether it is a new home or a plot of property, have done at least a cursory check using 
some imagery service.  The public use of this data is perfectly acceptable for this 
purpose.  To see what a potential neighbor looks like from on high may be nefarious in 
nature, but it is still perfectly legal if used in the context of an open space environment. 
From a macro standpoint, the citizenry welcomes the use of imagery satellites to 
characterize and manage natural or manmade emergencies; lives may depend on it.  In 
addition, there appears to be no problem in their use when exploitation of the 
environment or community is involved.  Society in general wants abuse identified and the 
culprits punished.  There is often the perspective that the larger the wrongdoer, especially 
if it is big business, the larger the punishment that should be handed.  At this level, where 
illegal logging, uncontrolled oil spills, or factory disasters, can be observed, satellite 
systems are well accepted by the American populace as evidentiary tools for the courts2.  
However, there is often a stark contrast when these same tools are used at the micro level 
towards individuals, and maybe rightly so. 
2 Satellite imagery is being used for litigation resulting from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. 
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D. CHAPTER BREAKDOWN 
This thesis examines the feasibility of using national assets, or alternative satellite 
systems, for the use of domestic law enforcement.  Chapter I identifies a simplified 
background on the use of satellite imagery that poses a basic examination of salient 
details necessary for inclusion, in addition to the principle focus, and provides a 
justification for its further exploration and study.  Chapter II explores the literature on the 
topic on satellite imagery along with the sub topics related to applications and systems 
technology, existing and former programs, and the law itself.  Key points will include 
their direct source, whether from government, industry, or academia, and elements of the 
literature search that required further inquiry.  Chapter III provides a discussion and 
background on satellite imagery and related subjects.  Basic systems technology, 
applications, and capability are presented, followed up with a history of civilian 
programs.  Chapter IV discusses key laws relating to surveillance and their impact.  
Chapter V provides the methodology and analysis of policy options studied.  In addition 
to showing current, former, and potential future program alternatives relating to satellite 
imagery support, a list of key considerations are presented along with an examination of 
pros and cons.  Chapter VI discusses the overall conclusions and lessons to be learned. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review provided a roadmap and approach to breaking down the 
subject of the domestic LE use of reconnaissance satellites.  A significant amount of 
technical data regarding systems capabilities was readily available, principally from 
government, academia, professional organizations, and industry groups.  Though 
applicable unclassified government sources provided an important element to the literary 
search, often the information was geared too much towards a military applications as 
oppose to a more civilian employment. 
Several categories of literature were explored that described applications and 
systems technology, existing and former programs, and the law.  Academia provided a 
significant amount of information on systems technology. The information was 
significantly greater than military sources that tended to be sparse due to classification 
issues, and it was better than industry sources because they had the tendency to be biased 
towards their specific products. 
A major source for credible information, as well as controversial information, that 
follows any type of surveillance activity included the General Accounting Office (GAO), 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and the Congressional Research Service (CRS).  
With the introduction of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and unmanned aircraft systems 
(UAS) incorporated into LE activities, questions are continuously being raised regarding 
the efficacy, legitimacy, and legality of aerial drone operations. This tied in very well 
with the principle issue of satellite surveillance.  Though the technology of national assets 
and surveillance drones are significantly different, the applications and necessary legal 
tenets are similar. 
A. APPLICATIONS AND SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY 
There are several publications on systems application and technologies that are 
accessible from multiple credible sources: key activities included academia, the 
American Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
 5 
Administration (NOAA), the U.S. Air Force Space Command, and the FAA Office of 
Commercial Space Operations.  If applications and systems capabilities could not be 
studied because of either military sensitivity or industry propriety, several inferences 
could be made with regards basic technology from unclassified sources. 
Imagery capability is an extremely sensitive topic to many government agencies, 
and rightly so.  However, with the exception of streaming data, private industry can 
provide imagery and sensor data for multiple uses and customers.  The technologies 
provided are comparable to government agencies and easily integrated into any civilian 
application.3  The shift from government to commercial is obvious within systems design 
and development.  It is apparent that though the U.S. government may own systems and 
manage operations, industry is leading development, systems capability, and launch 
services. 
The commercial space industry, both satellite manufacturing and launch services, 
has been growing since the mid-1990s.  Literature since the inception of Sputnik to 
today’s modern space ventures portray a tilting of the past government-only club to an 
activity run almost exclusively by private corporations.  To put the government to 
industry transition into perspective, though the U.S. government is a key owner of 
satellite systems, they are only a 10 percent customer-base on commercial systems.4 
One item identified early in the search presented that, despite an overall reduction 
in government launches in contrast to past years, an ever increasing prevalence of civilian 
ownership in space is apparent. Case in point, the Federal Aviation Office of Commercial 
Space Transportation projections are forecasting an average of 29.1 commercial space 
launches per year worldwide from 2012 to 2021.5  
3 Robert A. Weber and Kevin M. O’Connell Alternative Futures: United States Commercial Satellite 
Imagery in 2020 (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce andNational Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, 2011). 
4 United States General Accounting Office [GAO], Critical Infrastucture Protection Commercial 
Satellite Security Should Be Fully Addressed (GAO-02-781) (United States General Accounting Office: 
Washington, DC: 2002), 1–3. 
5 Federal Aviation Administration Commercial Space Transportation and Commercial Space 
Transportation Advisory Committee, 2012 Commercial Space Transportation Forecast (Washington, DC: 
Federal Aviation Administration, 2012), 1. 
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B. FORMER AND EXISTING PROGRAMS 
The domestic use of national assets is almost as old as their initial deployment 
during the Cold War.  From a historical perspective a prime literature source was derived 
from the National Security Archive, managed by George Washington University.6  The 
archive maintained several documents not only on the military application, but the 
domestic application of national assets as well. 
Declassified sources going as far back as 1967, detailed as the “Problems Relating 
to the Feasibility of Use of KH Photography by Civilian Agencies,”7 proposed making 
highly classified satellite imagery available to civilian agencies for mapping and science 
based programs.  Subsequent archival documentation would further describe the use of 
national asset imagery data for a host of non-intelligence civilian agencies.  Older 
documents show strictly mission oriented details, such as minimal discussion presents the 
law as it relates to Posse Comitatus, constitutional, privacy, or similar statutes that are 
prevalent issues today.  Literature from more recent satellite imagery providers included 
information from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), Civil Applications Committee 
(CAC), and the former Department of Homeland Security, National Applications Office 
(NAO). 
The CAC was developed to provide a conduit through which civilian agencies can 
coordinate the use national asset for non-military or intelligence tasking. A typical CAC 
mission would likely be scientific in nature to either support the civilian scientific 
community or government policy makers.  Similar to historical documentation, a 
significant amount of CAC source data is available through the National Security 
Archive.  Current literature, specifically as it relates to its mission, can be viewed through 
USGS sources.  However, though the activity provides a significant amount of 
information with regards to scientific, geological, and mapping tasking, with the 
6 The National Security Archive relating to U.S. domestic satellite reconnaissance can be viewed on 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB229/index.htm. 
7 National Security Archive, “U.S. Reconnaissance Satellites: Domestic Targets,” January 11, 1967, 
George Washington University, accessed March 23, 2013, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB229/01.pdf. Copy of memorandum  “Problems 
Relating to the Feasibility of Use of KH Photography by Civilian Agencies,” 1967. 
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exception to disaster support, minimal information was available on specific LE support.  
An offshoot to the CAC that was specifically designed to support the LE community was 
the NAO.  In 2005, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the 
USGS commissioned a blue-ribbon panel8 to identify how the CAC could better facilitate 
its satellite missions and data request coordination. As a result of the commission’s 
recommendations the DHS NAO was established in 2007.   
Unfortunately most, if not all, the literature found on the NAO was controversial 
from a civil liberties and privacy concern standpoint.  Being active for only two years 
before it was shut down, minimal information could be found on the actual utility of the 
program while it was active.9 
C. THE LAW 
Any space role, no matter the intension, whether  on government or commercial 
satellite platforms, for the purpose of safety and security, etc., is going to immediately 
present a potentially unwarranted domestic space surveillance motive to the citizenry; the 
scrutiny is justified.  When investigating the legitimacy of any type of surveillance, 
including satellite, the Fourth Amendment, which protects “persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable search and seizures,”10 is at the epicenter.  The use of 
advanced surveillance methods presents multiple questions; for example, does it in fact 
constitute an active “search” under the Fourth Amendment?11  Two key cases on the use 
on advanced surveillance include Katz v. United States12 and Kyllo v. United States;13 
both cases will be presented in greater detail in Chapter IV. 
8 Booz Allen Hamilton, Civil Applications Committee Blue Ribbon Study: Independent Study Group 
Final Report, 2005, Federation of American Scientists, accessed May 8, 2013, 
https://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/cac-report.pdf. 
9 Department of Homeland Security, “Secretary Napolitano Announces Decision to End National 
Applications Office,” news release, June 23, 2009, accessed September 20, 2012, 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/06/23/secretary-napolitano-announces-decision-end-national-applications-
office-program. 
10 U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV. 
11 Brody Korody, Satellite Surveillance within U.S. Borders (Ohio State University, OH: Moritz 
College of Law, 2005), 1641. 
12 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S 347, (1967).  
13 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, (2001).  
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Other key legal tenets where literature is readily available from multiple sources 
include the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) and Executive Order (EO) 12333.  The PCA was 
established, with few exceptions, to prohibit the American military and agencies from 
engaging in domestic law enforcement.14  Executive Order 12333—United States 
Intelligence Activities establish laws with regards to U.S. intelligence activities and their 
use both domestically and abroad. 
From a legal perspective, plenty of literature is available from multiple sources.  
An item that will be beneficial is taking the lessons learned from UAS and UAV 
surveillance and applying it to satellite systems. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The technical and operational aspects of imagery satellites are readily available; 
information from sensitive military programs could be easily inferred through 
complimentary commercial systems.  An impediment to LE getting direct access to 
national asset data, for any reason outside of monitoring and managing natural and 
manmade disasters, is the justified fear of establishing an even greater toehold in 
advanced domestic surveillance and the perception of an overextension of police powers.  
Though it was the author’s intent to draw a greater understanding of satellite systems and 
operations unto themselves, and leave out the role of law until further study was 
conducted, it became necessary to include it.  
In summary sub-category strengths and weaknesses were clearly identified:  
1. Science can be investigated easily, there were multiple sources and many 
indirect approaches to getting good information,  
2. A major weakness in the existing literature involved  minimal specific 
information regarding the ultimate utility and success of  civilian 
government agencies tasked with coordinating satellite operation; this is a 
topic that will require further investigation,  
3. Lessons learned from UAV and UAS programs can be readily applied to 
this research, and  
4. There is plenty of literature with regards to the law and surveillance.   
14 Korody, Satellite Surveillance, 1636. 
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The following chapter will provide an insight into many of the relevant aspects of 
satellite imagery and discuss in greater detail early programs, satellite technology and 
applications, and government programs designed to support LE activities. 
 10 
III. BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION 
Tonight we know how many missiles the enemy has, and it turned out our 
guesses were way off. We were doing things we didn’t need to do. We were 
building things we didn’t need to build. We were harboring fears we 
didn’t need to harbor. 
President Johnson, 196715 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Many deductions are made at the reverse engineering level to determine what 
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) systems, or national assets, past KH-9 can 
actually provide at the resolution level. Though often an interesting exercise, lacking vital 
data or imagery would make it a guessing game before a new generation of systems are 
deployed and existing systems are declassified.  In comparison to NRO equipment, often 
the question is asked: what can commercially available systems provide?  Just looking at 
Google and its use of GeoEye based products on Google Earth applications,16 using 
simple reverse engineering on available data sheets indicates that a GeoEye imagery 
satellite has an approximate resolution of half a meter.  A lot can be seen using this 
resolution; obliviously rural and urban structure will be somewhat easy to 
identify…vehicles will be easily discerned, albeit colors will be difficult to identify and 
the smaller the vehicle the harder it will be to identify.  One thing that commercial 
satellite for consumer use cannot do, at least for now, is identify an individual or small 
objects, look at a license plate, track individuals with any level of fidelity, look for the 
cat, or take a picture in real time. 
This section breakdowns information on the history, technology, and applications 
of both government and commercially available imagery. Though by no means complete, 
15 Smithsonian Air and Space Museum, “Satellite Reconnaissance: Secret Eyes in Space,” 2002, 
accessed June 15, 2013, http://airandspace.si.edu/exhibitions/space-race/online/sec400/sec400.htm. 
16 Google Earth, “Google Earth™ Integration Tools,” DigitalGlobe GeoFuse, 2013, accessed August 
31, 2013, http://geofuse.geoeye.com/landing/google-earth/. 
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the information provided will provide a basic notion of imagery application and at the 
very least provide a starting point for further enquiry. 
B. SATELLITE IMAGERY IN ITS PRIMACY 
1. Early and Current Military Satellite Programs 
With the increased risk of manned flight over Cold War Russian territory getting 
greater, despite the technological leaps in high attitude surveillance aircraft, another 
option was necessary to fill the US aerial reconnaissance gap.  The experimental concept 
of conducting satellite imagery started immediately after the Russian launch of Sputnik I, 
with the development of Discoverer.   
Program Discoverer commenced in 1956 and later transferred to the Defense 
Advanced Research Project Agency as a system that collected satellite imagery from 
space based platforms.  After a historic flight, where on August 11, 1960, Discoverer 14 
successfully returned a film canister from space, the program was renamed Corona and 
established a satellite reconnaissance program that would soon introduce the KH17 
satellite series that continues operations today in support of the NRO. 
The specialized film that Corona carried was developed by Eastman Kodak, 
utilizing a 70mm film strip, and with a 61centimeter focal length camera, it produced an 
initial resolution of 170 lines per millimeter.18  Recoverable drums started with  
2,400 meters of film in the KH-1 and eventually had a capacity of 4,900 meters by the 
KH-5.19  Using Itec Corporation cameras, imagery resolution started from a somewhat 
discernible eight meters to eventually two meters when the last collections were 
conducted and eventually declassified in 1995 up to KH-6 Lanyard imagery.20 Though 
extremely low in resolution compared to current systems, the pictures still provided early 
analyst a means to determine an area order of battle.  Specific weapons system and 
17 Keyhole (KH) denoted satellite photographic intelligence collection missions. 
18 National Reconnaissance Office, “Corona Fact Sheet,” National Reconnaissance Office, accessed 
April 27, 2013, http://www.nro.gov/history/csnr/corona/factsheet.html. 
19 Sidney D. Drell, “Physics and U.S. National Security,” Reviews of Modern Physics 71, no. 2 (1999): 
462. 
20 National Reconnaissance Office, “Corona Fact Sheet.” 
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deployment could be easily determined and provided military planners with a vital 
intelligence tool. 
Figure 1 depicts a canister recovery of KH film-based systems until KH-11 
digitized systems were deployed. 
 
Figure 1.  KH1 to KH-9 Film Recovery21 
Other NRO systems followed using the KH-5 to KH-12 Lacrosse Onyx.  With the 
development of systems came advanced technology, expanded mission capabilities, and 
an improved array of intelligence data for military planners.  As follow-on to the KH-4 
series, other systems included:  
1. KH-5 Argon: Program Argon, which had 13 launches and only six 
successful missions, started flights from 1961 to 1964 and maintained a 
21 National Reconnaissance Office, “CORONA Launch and Recovery,” National Reconnaissance 
Office, accessed August 15 2013, http://www.nro.gov/history/csnr/corona/sysinfo.html. 
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significant lower resolution in comparison to previous systems, up to two 
meter resolution for KH-4 flights as oppose to 140 meters for KH-5.22  
The key reason for this significant disparity and somewhat reduction in 
capability was its principle mission of polar region mapping development 
that inherently required less resolution as oppose to traditional satellite 
reconnaissance on military targets.23 
2. KH-6 Lanyard: Program Lanyard, which had three launches with only one 
successful mission, literally finishing the same year it began operations in 
1963, was an initial attempt to combine a tilting camera array, both 
forward and aft, to provide a stereo photography capability with a design 
resolution of two meters.24  Though an operational failure, Lanyard 
provided a significant technical stepping stone for future systems and 
operational advances. 
3. KH-7 Gambit 1: Program Gambit 1, which had 38 launches with 28 
successful missions conducted operations from 1963 to 1967, was 
considered one of the first successful high resolution reconnaissance 
satellites that broke the two to three foot high resolution barrier.25 
4. KH-8 Gambit 3: Program Gambit 3, which had 54 launches with 50 
successful missions conducted operations from 1966 to 1984, had many 
camera modifications.26 This includes a stabilized camera platform that 
22 Robert Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance (BYE-17017-74) (Washington, DC: National 
Reconnaissance Office, 1974), 100–102. 
23 Robert Brindschadler and Wendy Seider, Declassified Intelligence Satellite Photography (DISP) 
Coverage of Antartica *NASA/TM-1998-206879) (Greenbelt, MD: National Aeonautics and Space 
Administration, 1998). 
24 Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance.  
25 National Museum of the U.S. Air Force, “GAMBIT 1: KH-7 Reconnaissance Satellite,” last 




                                                 
allowed for clearer picture and a mechanism that economized film use 
resulting in the ability to conduct more collection missions.27 
5. KH-9 Hexagon: Program Hexagon, which had 20 launches with 19 
successful missions conducted operations from 1971 to 1986, along with 
most features of previous equipment, it maintained a large panoramic 
camera array that could image a large swath of landmass approximately 
370 miles in length.28  Hexagon’s principle mission was to collect large 
area imagery in addition to spot imagery; over 870 million square miles of 
area was collected during this program.29 
6. KH-10 Dorian: Program Dorian was a manned orbiting laboratory the 
principle purpose of which was to conduct satellite reconnaissance from a 
manned platform.  After one exploratory launch the program was 
cancelled.30 
7. KH-11 Kennan: Program Kennan, launched in December 1976, was the 
first satellite reconnaissance system to utilize electro optical digital 
imagery with a real-time capability31 developed with multiple variants. 
The oldest of these was operating for 17 years, and the last vehicle was 
launched on August 28, 2013.32 
With the last launch of the KH-11 Kennan series, the NRO has been replacing 
systems with classified programs, including the KH-12 Improved Crystal and Lacrosse 
Onyx, satellites that will have significantly more capability than previous systems.  A key 
27 National Reconnaissance Office, “Gambit 3 Fact Sheet,” September 2011, National Reconnaissance 
Office, accessed September 20, 2013, 
http://www.nro.gov/history/csnr/gambhex/Docs/GAM_3_Fact_sheet.pdf. 
28 National Reconnaissance Office, “Hexagon Fact Sheet,” September 2011, National Reconnaissance 
Office, accessed September, 2013, http://www.nro.gov/history/csnr/gambhex/Docs/Hex_fact_sheet.pdf. 
29 Ibid. 
30Dick Stevens and Roger Launius, Societal Impact of Space (Washington, DC: National Auronautical 
Space Administration, 2007), 293–294. 
31 National Reconnaissance Office, “50 Years of Vigilance from Above,” 2011, National 
Reconnaissance Office, accessed September 1, 2013, http://www.nro.gov/about/50thAnniv/50th-Flyer.pdf. 
32 William Graham, “ULA Delta IV-H launches with NROL-65,” August 28, 2013, accessed August 
30, 2013, http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2013/08/ula-delta-iv-h-launch-nrol-65/. 
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element in systems capability, in addition to digital data link, is the trend towards 
platforms that have a deployment cycle of over 10 years.33  Another trend that is 
occurring are missions being carried out primarily by government run systems but 
supplemented by commercial satellite owners and operators. 
2. U.S. Civilian and Commercial Satellite Programs 
According to the Satellite Industry Association 2012 State of the Industry Report, 
the increasing service demand for navigation, communication, and television satellite 
based products has created a business producing annual revenues in excess of $200-
billion,34 and has resulted in a multi-trillion dollar industry that touches every person on 
earth.  One item that was identified early presented an ever increasing civilian ownership 
of space, which the Federal Aviation Office of Commercial Space Transportation 
projections are forecasting an average of 29.1 commercial space launches per year 
worldwide from 2012 to 2021.35  With over 60 countries having a role in satellite 
ownership and operations,36 it is the opinion of this author that this assessment is low. 
Launched in July 1972, Landsat, whose mission was geared towards earth 
observation imagery, is the longest running civilian satellite activity to date, and the 
program continues to operate using seven satellite variants.  Started as a joint effort 
between NASA, whose role was to develop the space package and sensors, launch the 
system, and validate its performance, and USGS, who afterwards would assume custody 
of the equipment and would manage missions, collect data, analyze it, archive it, and 
distribute to respective customers.37 Landsat’s principle purpose is land and 
environmental scientific study.  Using an array of spectral band sensors, the system 
provides valuable information to the earth science communities to judge the relative 
33 Ibid. 
34 Satellite Industry Association, 2012 SIA State of the Satellite Industry Report, 2012, , accessed 27 
October, 2012, http://www.sia.org/about/. 
35 Federal Aviation Administration Commercial Space Transportation and Commercial Space 
Transportation Advisory Committee, 2012 Commercial Space Transportation Forecast, 1. 
36 Space Security Index, Space Security 2011 (Kitchener, Ontario: Pandora Press, 2011), 17. 
37 United States Geological Survey, “Landsat—A Global Land-Imaging Mission,” May 2013, 
accessed August 3, 2013, http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2012/3072/fs2012-3072.pdf. 
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health of a specific landmass relating to global change, climatology, forestry, agriculture 
and farming, and a host of other earth environment topics. 
There have been a number of iterations of Landsats with evolving capabilities. To 
draw a comparison between Landsat 1 and Landsat 8 with regards to sensor capabilities, 
Landsat 1, which operated from July 23 to August 5, 1972, only collected 1692 images at 
80 meters resolution.38 Using two scientific packages, seven sensors collected data in 
seven spectral bands.39  Landsat 8, the newest system deployed since February 11, 2013, 
will likely collect for years if not into the next decade.40 In addition, it will use a 
scientific package with 11 sensors collecting in 11 spectral bands.41   
Figure 2 shows almost 20 years of Landsat collected water characterization; dark 
blue indicate deep seas while lighter blue indicates shallower seas.42  The loss of water 
over this time span is attributed to the diversion of the River Jordan, the sea’s principle 
water source.43 
38 United States Geological Survey, “USGS Science for a Changing World,” Landsat 1 History. 




42 EarthSky, “View from Space: Dead Sea from 1972 to 2011” [image], EarthSky, April 16, 2012, 
accessed October 4, 2013, http://earthsky.org/earth/view-from-space-dead-sea-from-1972-to-2011. 
43 Rob Waugh,”Forty Years from 440 Miles Up: Nasa’s Landsat Releases Top 10 of Unforgettable 




                                                 
 
Figure 2.  Landsat Comparisons of the Dead Sea44 
In comparison to limited-access military programs, Landsat made satellite data 
available to the public for the first time.  As a precursor of  civilian access to improved 
imagery, with both the French (Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales—the French space 
agency) and Russian (Sovinformsputnik—a Russian satellite imagery provider) satellite 
industry making high resolution imagery, at three meters or less, available to the market 
place, the U.S. lifted restrictions on the sale of U.S. commercial imagery within the 
U.S.45  In 1994, the Clinton administration initiated policy that would allow commercial 
entities to participate in the burgeoning new market; ironically one of the newest 
customers became the IC itself.46  Having merged with several commercial satellite 
operators, DigitalGlobe would emerge as one of the largest purely commercial imaging 
satellites providers worldwide; its capabilities include: 
44 EarthSky, “View from Space: Dead Sea from 1972 to 2011.”  
45 Korody, Satellite Surveillance within U.S. Borders, 1635. 
46 Richard C. Olsen, Remote Sensing from Air and Space (Bellingham, WA: SPIE Press, 2000), 24–
29. 
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1. Ikonos: Launched in September 24, 1999, Ikonos was the first commercial 
system that could collect black and white panchromatic imagery with a 
resolution of .8 meters and color at 3.2 meters.47  Area collection consists 
of an operational swath width of 11.3 kilometers that results in a daily of 
collection of approximately 240,000 landmass square kilometers.48  The 
mission life span is expected to exceed 12 years.49 
2. Quickbird: Launched in October 18, 2001, Quickbird has a collection 
resolution capability of 64 centimeters.  Area collection consists of an 
operational swath width of 18.8 kilometers that results in a daily collection 
of approximately 200,000 landmass square kilometers at 450 kilometer 
altitude and approximately 100,000 landmass square kilometers at 300 
kilometer altitude.50  The mission lifespan is anticipated to continue to 
mid-2014.51 
3. Worldview-1: Launched in September 18, 2007, Worldview-1 has a 
collection resolution capability of half a meter.  Area collection consists of 
an operational swath width of 17.7 kilometers resulting in a daily 
collection of approximately 1.3 million landmass square kilometers.52  
The mission lifespan is anticipated to be approximately 10 to 12 years.53 
4. GeoEye-1: Launched in September 6, 2008, GeoEye-1 can collect black 
and white panchromatic imagery with a resolution of 41 centimeters and 
color at 1.65 meters.54  Area collection consists of an operational swath 




50 DigitalGlobe, “Quickbird Data Sheet,” July 2013, accessed July 19, 2013, 
http://www.digitalglobe.com/downloads/QuickBird-DS-QB-Web.pdf. 
51 Ibid. 
52 DigitalGlobe, “WorldView 1 Data Sheet,” January, 2013, accessed July 19, 2013, 
http://www.digitalglobe.com/downloads/WorldView1-DS-WV1-Web.pdf. 
53 Ibid. 
54 DigitalGlobe, “GeoEye-1 Data Sheet,” June 2013, accessed July 20, 2013, 
http://www.digitalglobe.com/sites/default/files/DG_GeoEye1_DS.pdf.   
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width of 15.2 kilometers results in a daily of collection of approximately 
350,000 landmass square kilometers.55  The mission life span is expected 
to exceed 10 years.56 
5. WorldView-2: Launched in October 8, 2009, WorldView-2 can collect 
black and white panchromatic imagery with a resolution of 46 centimeters 
and color at 1.85 meters.57  Area collection consists of an operational 
swath width of 16.4 kilometers resulting in a daily of collection of 
approximately 1,000,000 landmass square kilometers.58  The mission life 
span is expected to exceed 10 to 12 years.59 
Figure 3 shows one of the first foreign reconnaissance collections on a former 
Soviet Union airfield using Corona in 1960 and the same collection 50 years later using a 
commercial GeoEye system. 
 




57 DigitalGlobe, “WorldView-2 Data Sheet,” June 2013, accessed July 19, 2013, 
http://www.digitalglobe.com/downloads/WorldView2-DS-WV2-Web.pdf.   
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 National Security Archive, “The New Geospatial Tools: Global Transparency Enhancing 
Safeguards Verification,” October 27, 2010, accessed October 2, 2013, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB439/docs/Underground-Pabian.pdf. 
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The commercial space industry, both satellite manufacturing and launch services, 
has been growing since the mid-1990s.  Events since the inception of Sputnik to today’s 
modern space ventures portray a tilting of a government-only club to an activity run 
almost exclusively by private corporations.  To put the government to industry transition 
into perspective, though the U.S. government is a key owner of satellite systems, it is also 
a 10 percent customer-base on commercial systems.61  Civilian and commercial based 
satellite products are vital to all sectors: military, intelligence, civilian government, and, 
ultimately, the home consumer.  Though the exact capability of NRO-based national 
assets is unknown until the next declassification cycle, the typical web browser is 
routinely gaining access to high resolution data that would have been unheard of a decade 
ago. 
C. SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY 
Thousands of details are taken into consideration during an imagery collection 
effort, all of which could fill volumes of technical publications.  For the common 
nonscientific or nonmilitary user, several of these very specific details are not necessary 
to exploit satellite imagery.  To simplify specifics for the day-to-day user, short of the 
actual analysis itself, minimal key parameters need to be considered when either 
collecting or querying imagery.   
Though the military community will use a multitude of technical specifics to 
analyze an area of operation, enemy order of battle, site environmentals, and an array of 
other mission based tasks, typical users realistically do not have the luxury of an analysis 
shop that is capable of consolidating hundreds of details, often in real time, in a quick 
turnaround product. What is necessary is to have access to imagery itself and a time line 
of collection.  Taking these two key items into consideration, the ability to recognize an 
image and associate it with a time is the crux of its application.   
The starting point of the basics of imagery collection is to have an understanding 
of remote sensing as a whole.  Remote sensing defined is the measurement of object 
properties on the earth’s surface, without being in direct contact, where the data is 
61 GAO, Critical Infrastucture Protection Commercial Satellite Security, 1–3. 
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collected from an airborne vehicle.62  The interaction of the components of remote 
sensing involves the interaction between the sensor array and intended target, and a host 
of steps in between until a final data package is delivered to the consumer.  As shown in 
Figure 4, this process includes seven steps:63 
1. a natural or manmade source energy to illuminate the specific target of 
interest 
2. atmospheric interaction that the source energy will transit through to 
illuminate the target 
3. source energy interaction with the object where the target itself is 
characterized and data is returned, through the same atmosphere it entered, 
to the sensor collection array 
4. the sensor array further processes the data for transmission 
5. the sensor transmits the data, the ground based activity collects it and 
further processes it 
6. data is analyzed and distributed to the final end user 
7. and the final product is used for its specific application 
62 Robert Schowengerdt, Remote Sensing: Models and Methods for Image Processing (Burlington, 
MA: Academic Press, 2006), 2–3. 
63 Natural Resources Canada, “What is Remote Sensing?” last modified January 1, 2008, accessed 
September 1, 2013, http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/earth-sciences/geography-boundary/remote-
sensing/fundamentals/1924. 
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Figure 4.  Steps of Remote Sensing64 
One parameter that is discussed with regard to satellite application is resolution; 
this is the one term that is important for all end users to somewhat understand.  Two 
elements of resolution include either spacial, which relates to the image itself, and 
temporal, which relates to time.  Applying the two together combines the photographic 
detail of the image in relationship to collection time. 
Starting with spacial resolution, when using a satellite camera array, the amount 
of area coverage depends on the system’s instantaneous field of view (IFOV). Similar to 
taking ground based pictures, a wide IFOV will present a picture with a significant  
 
 
amount of area.  In contrast a picture with a narrow IFOV, or close up, will present a 
picture with a smaller amount of area.  The size of this footprint varies in relation to the 
altitude, or operating region, of the satellite system.   
As depicted in Figure 5, a system operating within low earth orbit (LEO), for 
example approximately 1000 kilometers altitude above the earth’s surface, will provide a 
64 Ibid.  
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15 percent earth surface observation area.  In contrast, a similar system in order to cover 
approximately a 43 percent swath of landmass may require an operating altitude within 
high earth or geosynchronous orbit (GEO) at approximately 36,000 kilometers.65  That is 
not to say the lower altitude system can widen its IFOV or the higher can narrow its 
IFOV, but depending on the platform, this may occur with a loss spacial resolution.   
 
Figure 5.  Earth Coverage66 
Using a football field as a target IFOV, Figure 6 presents a depiction of new 
commercial systems with regards to ground sampling, in comparison to older system 
capability.67   
65 Anil Kumar Maini, Satellite Technology: Principles and Applications (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010), 
120. 
66 Ibid.  
67 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Landsat 7 Science Data Users Handbook, March 
11, 2011, accessed August 28, 2013, http://landsathandbook.gsfc.nasa.gov/pdfs/Landsat7_Handbook.pdf.   
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Figure 6.  Commercial System Resolution Comparison68 
The second element after spacial resolution for operator consideration is object 
sampling, in the case of a single system orbit around the earth, within a certain time 
frame; this is referred to as temporal resolution.  Temporal resolution is a function of the 
time required for a single satellite to return to the same viewing starting point.   
The geographic area that is collected during this orbit is referred to as swath 
widths and can vary between tens and hundreds of kilometers wide.69  As depicted in 
Figure 7, after each orbital lap a new swath of landmass is collected during each rotation.  
Taking into consideration both the earth’s rotation and satellite flight path, most single 
68 Ibid. 
69 Department of Atmospheric Science, University of Alabama, “Principles of Satellite Remote 
Sensing, Satellite Orbits and Resolution,” accessed August 26, 2013, 
http://noaaaq.itsc.uah.edu/drupal/sites/noaaaq.itsc.uah.edu.drupal/files/module3.pdf.  
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LEO systems will not return to the same exact spot, or revisit time, for up to three days.70  
This detail is extremely important if new imaging data is constantly required.  Unless 




Figure 7.  Orbital Swath Width71 
D. CIVILIAN AND LAW ENFORCEMENT APPLICATION 
The domestic uses of government, as well as commercially owned satellite 
surveillance systems are no mystery. In addition to conducting intelligence collection for 
U.S. policy makers, the same systems have been used for civilian applications.  As early 
as 1967, in addition to collecting on domestic government facilities, military satellite over 
flights included several private facilities, including chemical companies Thiocol and 
Wyandotte, and the metals company Alcoa.  Why these particular facilities were imaged 
were never made clear; however, the missions were classified as “engineering passes,” 
which were conducted post launch to test the equipment sensor capability before they 
70 Remote Sensing Laboratory, Department of Forrest Resources, University of Minnesota, “High 
Resolution Satellite Imagery and Resource Management,” last modified 2011, accessed May 3, 2013, 
http://water.umn.edu/Documents/HighResolution.pdf. 
71 Department of Atmospheric Science, “Principles of Satellite Remote Sensing,” 
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were deemed operational to conduct foreign missions.72 Though not specific, this testing 
on fixed domestic facilities allowed photo intelligence interpreters, a new skill set at the 
time, to establish a data set of fixed structure and interpretation analysis. 
In addition to military applications and imagery analysis development, the USGS 
took advantage of these engineering passes to further enhance its mapping capability.73  
As a precursor to emergency management for the purpose of planning for disasters, both 
natural and potentially manmade, the Office of Emergency Preparedness requested 
Program CORONA over flights on over a hundred metropolitan relocation sites for the 
purpose of collecting “precontingency photo coverage.”74 
The lessons learned from these and subsequent over flights were being applied to 
almost real-time disaster monitoring.  As depicted in Figure 8 and Figure 9, pre-event 
data allows planners to establish, or fine tune, their emergency response activities, and 
post data allows for those same activities to conduct damage support. 
72 Chairman, COMOR Photo Working Group, “Declassified Memorandum: Revised List of Domestic 
Targets for KH-4,” April 28, 1967, accessed May 4, 2013, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB229/02.pdf. 
73 D. C. Truppner to D. H. Steinger, letter, circa July 1968, George Washington University, accessed 
May 7, 2013, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB229/06.pdf. 
74 Executive Office of the President, Office of Emergency Planning, “Letter to ARGO Steering Group 
Request for KH-4 Tasking,” 1968, accessed July 24, 2013, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB229/06.pdf. 
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Figure 8.  Hurricane Sandy Pre and Post75 
 
 
Figure 9.  Yosemite Park Fire, August 26, 201376 
 
75 Satellite Imaging Corporation, “Hurricane Sandy,” October 31, 2012, accessed August 1, 2013, 
http://www.satimagingcorp.com/gallery/geoeye-1-hurricane-sandy-after.html. 
76 SkyTruth, “Rim Fire, Yosemite National Park,” August 27, 2013, accessed September 2, 2013, 
http://blog.skytruth.org/2013/08/rim-fire-yosemite-national-park.html. 
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The 9/11 attack provides a classic example of a manmade disaster where quick 
time imagery was utilized from multiple vectors, as depicted Figure 10.  NOAA National 
Weather satellite services provided area specific data in support of both the Pentagon and 
lower Manhattan emergency support effort.77   
 
Figure 10.  Before and After September 11, 2001, at 1 Meter Resolution78 
On May 1998, President Clinton’s Presidential decision directive, “Protection 
Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and American’s Overseas” established 
the concept of National Special Security Events (NSSEs) where a high profile event 
could be placed in this category depending on its size, likely attendance of both domestic 
and foreign officials, its domestic or international significance, and level of support past 
the local jurisdiction level.79  As a result of this directive: 
77 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “NOAA’s Role in the Nation’s Recovery 
Efforts and the War on Terrorism,” NOAA Magazine, November 1, 2001, accessed May 3, 2013, 
http://www.magazine.noaa.gov/stories/mag2.htm. 
78 Remote Sensing Tutorial, “New York, Miami, Atlanta, New Orleans, Houston, Dallas-Fort Worth, 
St Louis, and Honolulu,” November 1, 2005, Federatoion of America Scientists, accessed November 17, 
2013, https://www.fas.org/irp/imint/docs/rst/Sect4/Sect4_2.html. 
79 Shawn Reese, National Special Security Events (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2009), 1. 
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In 2000, the Presidential Protection Act of 2000 became public law. 
Included in the bill, signed on December 19, was an amendment to Title 
18, USC § 3056 which codified PDD-62. Now, with the support of federal 
law, the Secret Service is authorized to participate “in the planning, 
coordination and implementation of security operations at special events 
of national significance.80 
NSSEs were placed in this event category because of their potential attraction to a 
terrorist attack and the likelihood of high casualties if successful.  Some examples of 
NSSEs included presidential inaugurations, state funerals, foreign summits, political 
conventions, and sporting and entertainment events.  As a result of being placed in this 
category, the full arsenal of federal government support and hardware, including satellite, 
was brought to bear to ensure the public’s safety and the security. 
In the case of using national assets for law enforcement actions, with the 
exception of NSSEs, an example of high profile cases where national assets were used 
included the Oklahoma City Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing, the 
Unabomber, and the DC Sniper investigation. 
In preparation for the trial of Timothy McVeigh for the Oklahoma City bombing 
the federal prosecution team handed a vast array of discovery evidence to the McVeigh 
defense team.  In addition to witness testimony that numbered over 21,000 and over 400 
hours of area surveillance video tape, satellite photographs of 20 sites in Oklahoma and 
Kansas that were taken by intelligence agencies were documented.81 
In an 18-year investigation that involved over 200 suspects, as it was working its 
way towards Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski’s cabin in Lincoln Montana, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) took extra steps to mix in with the area surroundings and 
utilized advanced surveillance methods to monitor their most significant lead. According 
to Nancy Gibbs from Time International: 
The agents were everywhere, disguised as lumberjacks and postal workers 
and mountain men.  They had draped the forest with sensors and 
80 United States Secret Service, “National Special Security Events,” 2012, accessed May 19, 2013, 
http://www.secretservice.gov/nsse.shtml. 
81 Richard Lacayo and Patrick E. Cole,”The State Versus McVeigh,” Time International, no. 16 (April 
1996): 32. 
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microphones, nestled snipers not far from the cabin, even summoned 
satellites to keep watch for a man practicing blowing things up.82 
On September 6, 2007, during a Committee on Homeland Security hearing titled 
“Turning Spy Satellites on the Homeland:  The Privacy and Civil Liberties Implications 
of the National Applications Office,” Charles Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer, Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security was queried by 
Representative Peter King, a ranking member on the Committee on Homeland Security 
regarding specific details relating to the National Applications Office; an organization 
that fell under the purview of the DHS Office of Intelligence Analysis.  One of the 
questions that were presented by Representative King to Charles Allen entailed the use of 
satellite imagery during the October 2002, DC beltway sniper attack. Allen replied:83 
I was requested by the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet at 
the time, acting on a request from Director Mueller, to image the 
interchanges between Pennsylvania and North Carolina, because of the 
killings that could occur and had occurred along the interstate, because the 
Bureau wanted the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency to outline the 
sites, places where snipers might hide. It was used, and Director Mueller, 
as I recall, was very gratified. 
It is very obvious that LE can make many uses of satellite imagery, more often 
than not, at minimal cost.  Shown in Figure 11, imagery can be used to better plan police 
activities.  Before arriving on a scene and in addition to drawing dispatch instructions and 
mapping data of the surrounding area, the police officer can draw imagery data to provide 
an extra level of intelligence to better plan scene ingress, egress, and, rural and urban 
details. The idea is that the more data that the approaching officer has the better. 
82 Nancy Gibbs, “Tracking Down the Unabomber,” Time International, no. 16 (April 1996): 24. 
83 Turning Spy Satellites on the Homeland: The Privacy and Civil Liberty Implications of the National 
Applications Office, Full Hearing of the Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives, no. 
110–68, 110th Congress, 1st sess. (2007), accessed February 2, 2013, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2007_hr/nao.html, 41–42. 
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Figure 11.  Oblique Satellite Image of School (Top) with 3D Enhancement (Bottom)84 
E. ORGANIZATIONS THAT EXIST OR HAVE EXISTED 
1. The Civil Applications Committee 
The first effort to establish a military satellite tasking facilitator for civilian use 
occurred with the development of the ARGO program in 1968, a precursor to the CAC.  
Principle membership includes agencies such as the USGS, the Office of Emergency 
Preparedness, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Agency for International 
84 Google Earth, image, accessed July 31, 2013, http://www.google.com/earth/. 
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Development, NASA, the Department of Transportation, the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, and the NRO.85 
Chartered in 1975, the CAC would make available national assets to civilian 
activities and “is an interagency committee that coordinates and oversees the civil use of 
classified collections.”86  Similar to ARGO, the committee maintains a membership of 11 
government departments and agencies and is chaired by the Director of the USGS. In 
addition, DHS has representation through the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA).  The purpose of the committee is to provide a liaison with the military and IC to 
coordinate requests with civilian federal government agencies, state and local 
governments, academia, and to a lesser extent LE. 
Most requests are geared towards climatic studies, natural disaster response, 
global change investigation, and ecosystem monitoring.87  All requests are submitted to 
the committee via the CAC Data Acquisition and Management Team for processing and 
coordination, where the committee reviews multiple requests at the USGS Advanced 
Systems Center located in Reston, Virginia. 
Primarily in the role of supporting science and policy development, a product that 
the CAC makes available is the Global Fiducials Program (GFP) in which the USGS 
maintains an imagery library of key world sites with environmental and earth science 
specific data.88  The public can query this information to monitor and study the impact of 
worldwide change in relationship to atmospheric, oceanic, geological processes, ice and 
snow dynamics, land use, and land coverage. 
85 Executive Office of the President, Office of Emergency Planning, “Memorandum for the Record, 
Subject: ARGO Committee Meeting 10 June 1968,” accessed May 8, 2013, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB229/05.pdf. 
86 United States Geological Survey [USGS] Advanced Systems Center—MS562, “The Civil 
Applications Committee Fact Sheet,” July 2001, Federation of American Scientists, accessed November 
12, 2012, http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/cac-fs.pdf. 
87 Bruce F. Molnia, “Monitoring Change as it Happens,” Geospacial Today, June 2013, accessed June 
20, 2013, http://geospatialtoday.com/gst/index.php?view=article&catid=48%3Aarticles&id=3208%3. 
88 United State Geological Survey, “Global Fiducials Library Data Access Portal,” January 2013, 
United State Geological Survey, accessed June 20, 2013, http://gfl.usgs.gov/index.shtml?current=1. 
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With the exception of disaster related material, which falls directly into the USGS 
purview, the ability to redirect satellite missions within its control is extremely restrictive, 
if non-existent.  However, what USGS has with regards to quick response data is 
archived mapping and imagery resources that can be downloaded and integrated onto 
commercial or government off the shelf GIS packages.89 As depicted in Figure 12, 
another USGS web-based product that is available to the public is the National Map 
Downloader and Viewer. 90  In some cases, though USGS imagery data may be old, it 
can be updated with newer imagery from other commercial satellite providers.  While the 




Figure 12.  USGS National Map Downloader and Viewer91 
 
89 FalconView is a government off-the-shelf-mapping GIS tool that supports an array of charts and 
imagery. The package is available free for download at www.falconview.org/trac/FalconView. 
90 The USGS National Map Viewer is a ready source of free mapping and imagery data available 
through the USGS at http://viewer.nationalmap.gov/viewer. 
91 United State Geological Survey, “The National Map,” United State Geological Survey, accessed 
June 20, 2013, http://viewer.nationalmap.gov/viewer.   
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2. The DHS National Applications Office 
In 2005, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the USGS 
commissioned a blue-ribbon panel to identify how the CAC could better facilitate its 
satellite missions and data request coordination.  Several recommendations were made, 
one of which was to have ready-access to satellite management and data to DHS for the 
purpose of law enforcement support and emergency management.92 As a result of the 
commission’s recommendations the DHS National Applications Office (NAO) was 
established.  As a further justification Charlie Allen, DHS Undersecretary for Intelligence 
and Analysis stated:93 
We need to move forward, get the NAO fully operational, and 
demonstrate how this 21st century capability will greatly aid the work of 
our scientists, our nation’s first responders, and others charged with 
protecting the United States. The NAO will act as a clearinghouse for 
available technologies such as overhead imagery to better serve the 
scientific, homeland security and, eventually, law enforcement 
communities, with a solid framework to protect privacy, civil rights and 
civil liberties. It is a good-government solution to assist those users, and 
there is nothing secretive or mysterious about its mission. In fact, the 
scientific work of the NAO has been done for more than 30 years by the 
Civil Applications Committee (CAC), which itself will become part of the 
NAO. But the CAC model is 30 years old, and the world we live in is far 
different and, in many ways, more complex than when the CAC was first 
formed. 
As a result of the recommendations presented from the Independent Study Group, 
the George W. Bush administration established a memorandum of cooperation between 
the Department of the Interior and DHS,94 resulting in the establishment of the of the 
NAO.  Starting on May 2007, the DNI appointed DHS as the key manager of the NAO, 
92 The commission concluded that there was “an urgent need for action, because opportunities to better 
protect the nation are being missed.” It recommended the creation of an entity “to provide a focal point and 
act as a facilitator to overhead imagery and other resources on behalf of civil, homeland security and law 
enforcement users.” Booz Allen Hamilton, Civil Applications Committee Blue Ribbon Study 
93 Charlie Allen, “Why the Country Needs the National Application Office,” DHS Leadership Journal 
Archive, July 15, 2008, accessed November 11, 2012, http://www.dhs.gov/journal/leadership/2008/07/why-
country-needs-national-applications.html. 
94 United States Geological Survey, “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of the 
Interior Acting through the U.S. Geological Survey and the Department of Homeland Secueiry Pertaining 
to Geospacial Information and Remote Sensing for Homeland Security,” March 13, 2006, United States 
Geological Survey, accessed April 20, 2013, http://www.usgs.gov/mou/mouwithdhs.pdf. 
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making it responsible for the new agency’s mission, operations, management, and 
oversight.95  The NAO’s primary functions would include:96 
1. facilitating access to IC resources and capabilities 
2. ensuring IC provided data is used in a lawful and appropriate manner 
3. safeguarding privacy civil rights and civil liberties 
4. promote the effective use of IC resources 
5. share information 
6. protect sources and methods 
7. provide representation 
8. sponsor applications of the CAC and National Capabilities Program; the 
CAC’s lead office  
For two years, NAO had direct access to satellite operations and analysis to 
provide natural disaster and law enforcement support.  However, in addition to the office 
being a redundant activity to the CAC, the concerns of a single government agency 
having direct access to national assets for the sole purpose of domestic LE surveillance, 
albeit with significant oversight, drew considerable scrutiny on civil liberty and privacy 
concerns.  On June 23, 2009, DHS Secretary Napolitano shut the office down stating:97 
This action will allow us to focus our efforts on more effective 
information sharing programs that better meet the needs of law 
enforcement, protect the civil liberties and privacy of all Americans, and 





95 Richard A. Best and Jennifer K. Elsea, Satellite Surveillance: Domestic Issues (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2011), 6. 
96 National Security Archive, “CHARTER National Applications Office,” February 5, 2008, 
GeorgeWashington University, accessed May 7, 2013, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB229/48.pdf, 3–5.  
97 Department of Homeland Security, “Secretary Napolitano Announces Decision.” 
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F. DISCUSSION SUMMARY 
Fifty years’ after Project Corona, the access and technology associated with 
satellite exploitation has increased exponentially.  Packages that entail an extremely high 
level of imagery resolution quality, which was previously only reserved for the military, 
is now readily available to civilian users at cost or often free on the internet.  The LE 
application of advanced imagery is very apparent. 
Though the specific level of resolution for current national assets is classified, 
high resolution commercial satellites, which also conduct military and intelligence 
collection, are actively deployed and provide similar capability with minimal, if no, legal 
distribution restriction.  Prior to the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, 98 high 
resolution imagery, less than one meter, was available to only the military reconnaissance 
community.  Because of the shift of more commercial imagery satellites being deployed 
just prior to the 1990s, the enactment of the act opened markets for commercial providers 
to collect and distribute similar high resolution imagery to the civilian community. 
In stark contrast to today, when reconnaissance satellites were initially being 
deployed post-Sputnik, and though the principle mission of military and intelligence 
collection was apparent, consideration for civil use was formulated with minimal thought 
for privacy and civil liberty concerns. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the new 
technology was in its infancy did not warrant a concern.  Today, this is not the case.  The 
concern for another level of advanced surveillance means, though advantageous to LE, is 
extremely concerning to the citizenry, especially for a system that can indiscriminately 
blanket an entire populace to find a single target. 
Technology is the easy part; it will occur and likely at an exponential rate.  
However, the public unease of yet another level of surveillance scrutiny will likely 
increase until a mechanism can be established to assuage the warranted concerns.  
The next chapter presents key elements of the law relating to surveillance.  
Particular consideration will be given to constitutional law, specifically the Fourth 
Amendment.  A case law review will discuss how the Fourth Amendment has impacted 
98 15 USC, Chapter 82. 
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surveillance through the ages.  Other legal tenets discussed will include both statutory 
and executive orders concerning the use and restrictions of national assets, the military, 
and IC in LE activities. 
 38 
IV. THE LAW 
The use of satellite imagery in the context of disaster management and support is 
a vital tool for emergency services and LE.  This application has a long lineage of success 
dating back to the1960s and 1970s when domestic test flights, or “engineering passes” 
were used to collect “precontingency photo coverage,” and later developed into 
emergency management plans for U.S. major cities.99 This was prior to foreign KH-4 
imagery collection missions. 
With technology very advanced for the time, the future ramifications of satellite 
surveillance as a domestic collection tool was likely not even considered; to many people 
it may have still been science fiction.  This section will discuss key elements of the law as 
it relates to surveillance, the legal impact of technology, and its resulting reinterpretation 
from a constitutional point of view. In addition other relevant legal tenets and case law 
will be discussed.  
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Technical and operational capabilities are but a small facet to any satellite program, the 
most significant detail of their use includes the application of law and how, or if, they can 
be used in an LE activity.  Though proper police surveillance is conducted well within the 
doctrine of the law and is constantly managed by the courts, the use of advanced 
technology often adds a level of complexity to legal compliance and oversight.  The basis 
of all surveillance law and compliance within our legal system as it is today derives from 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which states: 
[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or things to be seized.100 
99 Executive Office of the President, Office of Emergency Planning, “Letter to ARGO Steering Group 
Request for KH-4 Tasking.”  
100 U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV. 
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From a perspective of surveillance activity, the Fourth Amendment protects the 
citizenry from unlawful search and seizure.  In the framework of advanced surveillance 
methods, the edict restricts the methods and greatly mandates oversight required in its 
collection.  Unlike a search that involves LE physically being on the questionable 
property, the introduction of technical means allows potential evidence to be collected 
from a distance.  Traditionally, the Fourth Amendment applied only to cases where there 
was a physical invasion of property.101  
Over a hundred years after the ratification of the Bill of Rights, one of the first 
Fourth Amendment cases relating to the legal validity of advanced technical collection 
for law enforcement purposes was tested in Olmstead v. United States. 102 The case in 
question involved Roy Olmstead, who was suspected of unlawfully possessing, 
transporting, and selling alcohol in violation of the National Prohibition Act. In this case, 
a portion of the evidence introduced included wiretapped conversations.103 
The courts determined that the Fourth Amendment’s function “was to prevent the 
use of governmental force to search a man’s house, his person, his paper and his effects; 
and to prevent their seizure against his will.”104 The courts ultimately determined that 
because investigators did not remove any “tangible material effects” or conduct in any 
“physical invasion” of property, the Fourth Amendment did not apply.105 In the Olmstead 
case, the lack of physical intrusion was key to the case; without it, constitutional violation 
did not occur.  The ruling would remain into effect for almost 40 years until Katz v. 
United States was decided.  
Olmsted v. United States was overruled in 1967 as a result of the findings in Katz 
v. United States.106  In the Katz case, Charles Katz moved to have evidence suppressed 
101 Reginald Short, “The Kyllo Conundrum: A New Standard to Address Technology that Represents 
a Step Backward for the Fourth Amendment Protections,” Denver University Law Review 80, no. 2 (2002): 
463–466.  
102 Olmstead v United States, 277 U.S. (1928). 
103 Ibid.  
104 Ibid., 463. 
105 Ibid., 466. 
106 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S 347, (1967).  
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under a claim of a Fourth Amendment violation. He argued that a listening device planted 
by federal agents while he was wagering illegal betting information in an enclosed public 
phone booth was unlawfully collecting information.107  Katz contended that his privacy, 
within an enclosed phone booth,108 was violated as a result of an illegal search and 
seizure conducted in contravention to the Fourth Amendment.  During his appeal, it was 
later determined in the Supreme Court that the Fourth Amendment is applicable to 
individuals; however, it is not to particular places.109   
To draw a comparison between Olmstead and Katz, in Olmstead, noncompliance 
of the Fourth Amendment required an intrusion upon one’s property; however, in Katz, it 
drew the line at “people not places.”110  As a result of that line, the courts ruled in favor 
of Katz; however, the ruling established a test that would determine individual privacy 
compliance, as well as constitutional conformity, when applied to future cases. The 
privacy standard now entails a more nuanced set of criteria where 1) the person must 
have an expectation of privacy, and 2) the expectation must be reasonable.111   
The Katz case is a landmark case that brings into question any surveillance used 
by the government.  Extra care by LE, from local to federal jurisdictions, are  required to 
ensure that when required warrant-based approval is required, it takes into consideration 
the technology to be used.  Other pertinent Fourth Amendment cases related to advanced 
collection methods include Kyllo v. United States, California v. Ciralol, Dow Chemical 
v. United States, and Florida v. Riley. 
In Kyllo v. United States,112 Danny Lee Kyllo moved to have evidence 
suppressed under the Fourth Amendment.  Upon suspicion that Kyllo was growing 
marijuana in his residence, the police officers collected thermal imagery of his house; it 
107 Ibid., 348. 
108 Ibid., 352. 
109 Ibid., 361. 
110 Ibid.   
111 “Katz v. United States,” Case Briefs, last modified 2013, accessed November 30, 2012, 
http://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/criminal-procedure/criminal-procedure-keyed-to-saltzburg/searches-
and-seizures-of-persons-and-things/katz-v-united-states-3/. 
112 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,  (2001). 
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was their intension to use this data to acquire a warrant to search Kyllo’s home. 113  
When the police collected the thermal imaging, it was determined that Kyllo’s domicile 
was hotter than his neighbors.114  A warrant was subsequently issued and upon search of 
Kyllo’s residence, 100 marijuana plants were discovered, which resulted in his immediate 
arrest.115  The question presented, does the use of a device (in this case a thermal imager) 
used to obtain evidence from a constitutionally protected area, without a physical 
intrusion, amount to a search under the Fourth Amendment?116  The key finding from the 
court determined that Fourth Amendment protections are not conditional upon quality of 
information to obtain a warrant; even the minutest of intimate details uncovered using 
thermal imagery from inside Kyllo’s house were classified as a search.117  The courts 
ruled that the use of thermal imaging prior to the granting of a warrant, similar in Katz v. 
United States, constituted an invasion of privacy contrary to the Fourth Amendment 
resulting in Danny Kyllo’s case being overturned. 
In another case, California v. Ciraolo,118 the police received information that 
Dante Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his backyard.  However, due to a series of high 
fences in the defendant’s yard, the police could not observe the activity from the adjacent 
street.119  To remedy this and prior to obtaining a warrant, the police acquired an aircraft 
and flew over Ciraolo’s home at an altitude of approximately 1,000 feet to get a better 
view and easily spotted the marijuana plants being grown.  Because a fence was installed 
on his property, Ciraolo argued that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy and 
that the search constituted an invasion of his privacy in violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights.  It was determined that the defendant did in fact have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy on the ground; however, that expectation of privacy did not 
113 Ibid., 29. 
114 Ibid., 30. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid., 31. 
117 Ibid., 37. 
118 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
119 Ibid., 216. 
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include all vantage points.120  The court determined that the police have a right to share 
the same area that the public has access to, in this case, public airspace.121  Because the 
public could freely look down on Ciraolo’s from this location, it was not considered an 
invasion of privacy under Fourth Amendment protection.122 
In a case involving a corporation, as opposed to an individual, Dow Chemical 
Company v. United States,123 a question was presented to the courts to determine if the 
use of aerial photography without a warrant constituted a Fourth Amendment violation. 
In conducting its mission, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) gained 
permission for an on-site inspection of one of Dow’s facilities, a 2,000 acre chemical 
manufacturing plant.124After the initial inspection, the EPA requested and was denied a 
follow-up assessment.125 The EPA subsequently “employed a commercial aerial 
photographer, using standard floor-mounted, precision aerial mapping camera, to take 
photographs of the facility from attitudes of 12,000 feet, 3,000 feet, and 1,200 feet.”126 
Upon learning of this activity, Dow brought suit claiming that the EPA violated its Fourth 
Amendment rights.  Similar to the Ciraolo case, these flights were conducted within 
public airspace and the photographic equipment used, though exacting and designed to 
collect images in great detail were “commonly used in mapmaking.”127 In its ruling, the 
court determined that the EPA’s aerial photography mission did not constitute a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.128 
120 Ibid., 212–213. 
121 Ibid., 213–214. 
122 Tyler Pittman, “Constitutional Searches from Space—Part I: California v. Ciraolo and Remote 
Sensing,” National Center For Remote Sensing, Air, and Space Law, University of Mississippi School of 
Law, July 12, 2012, accessed September 23, 2013, 
http://rescommunis.olemiss.edu/2012/07/12/constitutional-searches-from-space-part-i-california-v-ciraolo-
and-remote-sensing/. 
123 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
124 Ibid., 229. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid., 231. 
128 Ibid. 
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In yet another case, Florida v. Riley129 challenged the constitutional legitimacy of 
collecting within a curtilage130 of private property.  Upon receiving a tip, the police 
utilized a helicopter to observe Michael Riley’s property to determine if he was growing 
marijuana.131 After circling at 400 feet in a helicopter, the police were able to identify 
marijuana plants growing in an enclosed greenhouse that had two roof panels missing.132  
As a result of the direct observation of inside of Riley’s greenhouse, a warrant was 
executed resulting in Riley’s property being searched, the marijuana discovered, and, 
ultimately, his subsequent arrest.  133 This was similar to the cases involving Dow and 
Ciraolo where the observations were conducted in public airspace.   
According to the courts on Florida v. Riley, three factors are essential in invoking 
Fourth Amendment protection: 1) the surveillance was sufficiently rare, 2) the 
surveillance interfered with the normal use of the curtilage, and 3) the surveillance 
detected intimate details connected with the home or curtilage.134  There may have been 
a rationalization for claiming that the greenhouse was a curtilage and an enclosed 
structure; however, because the illegal crops could be seen as a result of the missing 
panels, the greenhouse was not considered a secure curtilage at that time. As a result, the 
expectation to privacy was nullified, and the surveillance was not considered a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.135 
Satellite imagery, which features images from above, is becoming more available 
to all sectors of society.  Though dated, an individual can query the web and view 
household activity just by observing the image collected For example, an individual can 
determine: if there was an addition to a house built, who was home (by looking at parked 
129 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).  
130 Curtilage is an area, usually enclosed, encompassing the grounds and buildings immediately 
surrounding a home that is used in the daily activities of domestic life. Black’s Law Dictionary Free Online 
Legal Dictionary (2nd ed.), s.v. “curtilage,” accessed November 19, 2013, 
http://thelawdictionary.org/curtilage/. 
131 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid., 449. 
134 Ibid., 451–452. 
135 Ibid. 
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cars), if a person maintain the property, and a host of other information.  The image is 
taken from the airspace above the domicile or property in question.  
California v. Ciraolo, Dow Chemical Corporation v. United States, and Florida v. 
Riley were all cases where the key evidence was collected via aerial surveillance.  
Though somewhat surreptitious in nature, all of this evidence was collected in an area 
where the common citizen has free access to, public airspace.  This holds true today. 
Clearly, the majority of the public does not routinely venture in the realms of space; 
however, that same public has ready access to space borne sensor equipment by merely 
connecting to the web.  In its primacy, the government significantly restricted the 
availability of satellite imagery to the public, and rightly so. However, with the 
commercial sector maintaining a large share of the industry, the access to greater satellite 
sensor capability will be on hand for all.  Katz and Kyllo were landmark cases that 
changed constitutional interpretation as it relates to technology.  Time will show that 
though constitutional doctrine is sacred, levels and expectations of privacy will also 
change as technology evolves and societal norms are reconsidered.  
B. THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 
Though national assets are routinely used in disaster management and support,136 
the question is often asked about the inability of LE to readily use the same equipment to 
conduct criminal activities.  The answer is that the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) prohibits 
the U.S. military from directly taking part in law enforcement; PCA makes it clear that it 
is a crime for an individual or activity:  
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized 
by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the 
Army or the Air Force as a posse Comitatus or otherwise to execute the 
laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, 
or both.137 
136 The Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121 allows for national assets to be readily used for natural and 
manmade disaster support. 
137 18 U.S.C. § 1385. 
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Questionable PCA activity, when not properly administered, can occur in the 
arena of LE support.  Being owned and operated by either the military or IC, the use of 
national assets by an LE activity from a legal perspective is very restrictive.  A key test in 
its compliance indicates that: 
The Courts have held that, absent a recognized exception, the act is 
violated (1) when civilian law enforcement officials make “direct active 
use” of military investigators, (2) when the use of the military “pervades 
the activities” of the civilian officials, or (3) when the military is used so 
as to subject citizens to the exercise of military power that is regulatory, 
prescriptive, or compulsory in nature.138   
Though the act is extremely restrictive in what the military can and cannot provide, 139  it 
still allows the military to engage in activities that will support or incidentally benefit LE; 
an example, to name a few,  would include participation in joint exercises and training. 
In some cases, Congress has exempted PCA, through the Military Cooperation with Law 
Enforcement Officials Act of 1981,140 from activities involving drug interdiction and 
operations within U.S. borders to more recently the war against domestic terrorism.  An 
example of a high profile criminal investigation that used military resources involved the 
investigation of the DC beltway sniper attacks during the fall of 2002.  The FBI asked for 
and received support from the DoD to provide aerial surveillance of the Washington 
metro area using an Army RC-7B with sensor equipment to potentially pinpoint gunfire.  
Though the flight crew and sensor operators were military personnel, they were managed 
by and reported to civilian law enforcement, thus making the military/civilian LE 
relationship completely PCA compliant.141 The military is forbidden to engage in direct 
LE activity,142 including both investigation and arrest powers; however, the military is 
empowered, with prior approval, to provide indirect advice, support, and equipment.143 
138 Best and Elsea, Satellite Surveillance: Domestic Issues, 19. 
139 The PCA surprisingly does not specifically apply to the Navy or Marine Corps. 
140 10 U.S.C. §§371–378 (2001). 
141 Christopher M., Petras, “Eyes on Freedom-A View of the Law Enforcement Use of Satellite 
Reconnaissance in U.S. Homeland Security,” Journal of Space Law 31, no. 1 (2005): 111.  
142 Unless, under 10 U.S.C. §§ 382 (2001), direct action is “considered necessary for the immediate 
protection of human life, and civilian law enforcement officials are not capable of taking the action.” 
143 10 U.S.C. §§ 382. 
 46 
                                                 
For example, in United States v. Hartley and Murphy,144 Allen Hartley and John 
Murphy were arrested for illegally transporting marijuana into the United States. Both 
contested that evidence was seized during a military operation and should have been 
excluded on the grounds of a violation of the PCA.145  A military operation was 
occurring at the time where Air Force flight crews of the 552nd Airborne Warning and 
Control Systems (AWACS) Wing conducting training.146  Also on this particular training 
flight was a United States Customs Service (USCS) agent who was assigned to a sensor 
station. Both the USCS and Air Force had a joint program that allowed civilian agents to 
fly onboard military aircraft on a space available basis.147  During this mission, the 
onboard military liaison officer to the USCS spotted an unidentified aircraft approaching 
United States territory.  The observing airborne USCS agent also tracked the unidentified 
aircraft and radioed Customs officers of its flight; at no time did the Air Force stop its 
original training mission.148 The Customs service subsequently intercepted and tracked 
the unidentified aircraft.  The USCS agent on the AWACS continued monitoring the 
aircraft when it landed on an unfinished highway in Louisiana and shortly took off.149 
When Customs agent and non-military officials arrived at the landing site, they found a 
large quantity of marijuana and Allen Hartley, who was subsequently arrested.  The 
USCS agent onboard the AWACS continued monitoring the aircraft after it took off and 
tracked it until the aircraft landed in Mississippi where John Murphy was arrested.150  At 
no time were the military directly involved in the LE activity; as a result, the courts 
denied the motion to suppress the evidence based on a Posse Comitatus Act violation.151 
144 United States v. Hartley and Murphy, 796 F.2d 112 (1986). 








                                                 
In United States v. Roberts and Hawk,152 James Roberts and Clifton Hawk were 
arrested on the high seas while transporting marijuana on their vessel the Sea Waltz; both 
contend that the United States Navy participation in their arrest was in violation of the 
PCA.153  The Sea Waltz was observed 130 miles west of Mexico and 1800 miles south of 
San Diego by the U.S.S. Reid, a Navy guided missile frigate.154  As part of a Navy and 
Coast Guard joint cooperation effort, five Coast Guard personnel were on board the U.S.S 
Reid to conduct law enforcement missions.155  The Coast Guard contacted Sea Waltz, a 
41 foot sailboat, by radio to announce its intension of boarding the vessel.156  The Coast 
Guard team was dispatched by the U.S.S. Reid in a boarding boat with a Navy crew.157  
As the boarding party approached Sea Waltz, the smell of marijuana became apparent.158  
When Sea Waltz was boarded multiple bales were discovered; after one of the bales 
tested positive for marijuana, it was taken in as evidence and the Sea Waltz crew, 
including Roberts and Hawk, were arrested and taken onboard the U.S.S. Reid.159  The 
Sea Waltz was towed; however, after taking on water, and due to the inability of the 
Coast Guard crew to further salvage the vessel, it was shot with gunfire from the U.S.S. 
Reid and sank.160  Though the Navy supported the Coast Guard operation, by providing 
equipment and personnel support, the Coast Guard directed the law enforcement 
operation; as a result the courts denied the arrest operation was unlawful due to Posse 
Comitatus Act Violation.161 
152 United States v. Roberts and Hawk, 779 F.2d 565 (1986). 
153 Ibid., 567. 






160 Ibid., 567. 
161 Ibid., 569. 
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Where PCA specifically restricts the military, Executive Order (EO) 12333162 is 
designed to restrict the role of the IC. The order prohibits the IC from collecting, 
investigating, and distributing data on U.S. citizens; however, similar to PCA, EO 12333 
has language that allows the IC to support LE in domestic spy cases, terrorism, and drug 
activities.163  Other key elements of the order specifies that the support activity must also 
be coordinated and approved by the providing activity and Attorney General.164 This is 
similar to PCA, in that it allows the use of equipment and assistance to local LE165 when 
approved and mandates “the least intrusive collection techniques feasible within the 
United States or directed against United States persons abroad”166 The order also makes 
clear that “Nothing in this order shall be construed to authorize any activity in violation 
of the Constitution or statutes of the United States.”167 
With the availability of commercial satellite providers becoming increasingly 
prevalent, along with the accompanying sensor capabilities that may be more than 
adequate to prepare LE operational plans, the use of national assets for domestic purposes 
may begin to wane except for a high profile national security events.168  As more 
commercial systems are incorporated into local LE activities, PCA or EO 12333 will not 
have to be considered.  If the use of real-time data is required for an operation, aerial or 
UAS flights will fill the gap further negating the legal concern for military or IC support 
compliance. 
162 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981), as amended by Executive Orders 13284 (2003), 13355 (2004) and 
13470 (2008). 
163 Ibid., Paragraph 2.6. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid., Paragraph 2.4. 
167 Ibid., Executive Order 12333, Paragraph 2.8. 
168 An example may include an NSSE, covered under the Presidential Protection Act of 2000, or 
natural and manmade disasters requiring government satellite support.  
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C. CONCLUSION 
Several topics were presented regarding the application of satellite surveillance in 
relationship to the law.  Though the ability to use equipment that streamlines a 
surveillance operation is available in many variants, and can be applied from many 
vectors, consideration of the law is paramount.  Surveillance, if improperly conducted, is 
a very easy aspect of an investigation that can be challenged in a court of law; judicial 
compliance and oversight is vital to its unimpeded use in the courts.  The complexity of 
the law in comparison to technology is apparent; since Katz,169 and maybe as early as 
Olmstead170 when technology was first challenged, the constant retooling of the 
Constitution is apparent; and necessary.   
A key constitutional question presented in all of the aforementioned cases 
indicated that if an observation was being conducted in a thoroughfare where the public 
has free access, then that observation was not a search per the Fourth Amendment; many 
examples were presented on police over flights in public airspace.  The same can be 
presented of Riley171 doing a reasonably decent job of maintaining a marijuana growing 
operation within the curtilage of his property, however mismanaging the integrity of the 
curtilage itself; the second that his greenhouse enclosure was opened and could be 
observed from public airspace, at that very moment, Riley no longer had a Fourth 
Amendment case. 
Similar questions could be presented with regards to PCA; with the best tools 
available for military and intelligence collection, how come they are not regularly used to 
investigate criminal activity on American soil?  Case law indicates that the application of 
military equipment and talent clearly benefits the LE cause.  Though the military and IC 
have superior surveillance tools and personnel to operate it, does the American citizenry 
want them playing a direct role in law enforcement; probably not.  And with commercial 
satellite resources becoming more available, is it necessary?  As new surveillance 
169 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S 347, (1967). 
170 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, (1928). 
171 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
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technology and methodology occur, judicial parties and the courts will be challenged to 
ensure that the law is keeping up, yet at the same time ensuring that base legal doctrine is 
not compromised. 
The next chapter will present various policy options for considerations.  Using an 
analytical framework and method, a discussion will be presented describing each 
program’s pros and cons, and a graded determination will identify an optimum approach 
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V. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH ANALYSIS 
This thesis is exploring various options where LE can gain greater access to 
imagery through national assets, or a suitable alternative.  Key questions were discussed 
to identify and analyze potential courses of actions.  First, what would the likely 
legislative confidence and support be?  Second, what level of legal issues will need to be 
explored?  Third, what would a notional projected cost be?  Finally, what would be the 
program’s relative ease of implementation? 
Allowing the use of satellite imagery on the surface provides many benefits to 
police surveillance and investigation.  When satellite surveillance is presented in non-
technical generalities to the general public towards its utility on a foreign battle field, or a 
domestic disaster zone, the level of acceptance is very apparent.  Though likely 
compartmentalized and watered down, in comparison to raw data, the citizenry more than 
welcomes the opportunity to view what government based satellites are presenting to 
planners. 
From a macro perspective the American public finds this surveillance acceptable. 
As previously mentioned, if criminal activity in the form of environmental exploitation or 
similar against the community can be identified using this data, it is very unlikely that 
there would be significant disagreement on the circumstances of its collection and its 
application in a court of law.  Though there is no record of its employment, the same may 
be said if satellite imagery could be used as evidence during a high profile criminal 
offence against American society as a whole; the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing may 
be a perfect example.  
However at the micro level against an individual who may not be engaged in a 
high profile crime or a wrong against the community, society often balks at this level of 
surveillance.  In contrast to most countries, the American notion of living in any degree 
of a surveillance state, whether in plain site or not, often exudes a feeling of interference 
in an individual’s life to a level of healthy, or unhealthy, paranoia; in comparison to a 
pre-digital way of life, a person could very easily lead a rather anonymous life.  From a 
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members of the public point of view this activity, though likely justified in many cases, 
raises several levels of warranted concerns of how their individual data points are 
collected, archived, managed, and why.  With technology as exacting as it is, why are the 
innocent being mixed in among the guilty often with a broad band collection method; is 
there a system of separating the good from the bad?  
A. METHODOLOGY APPROACH 
The mode of analysis to be utilized for this study will be a policy options analysis.  
This methodology provides the best path because it studies a program that may be 
inefficient or unworkable, compares it to other similar programs, identifies what works 
and doesn’t, draws a comparison of each, and determines an optimum program approach.  
For the purpose of identifying and examining current programs, modified programs, and 
notional programs not in existence as a potential singular LE satellite surveillance 
methodology, the “eightfold path” for policy analysis, was utilized.  This approach, 
which was promoted by Eugene Bardach, from the Goldman School of Public Policy, 
University of California, provides a method that unto itself takes an extremely complex 
process, breaks it down into eight simple steps from defining the problem to deciding an 
approach, and identifies an optimum policy option. 
According to Bardach, and in the context of this policy analysis, the following 
steps include172: 
Step 1. Entails defining the problem; for the purpose of this thesis, the relative 
inability for LE to acquire imagery derived from national assets along with 
the requisite analysis and interpretation support; as well as the American 
public’s concern for potential unfettered and unwarranted invasion of 
privacy and civil liberties in contrast to Constitution laws. 
Step 2. Involves collecting data to populate the analysis process; in this topic 
several similar yet diverse elements needed to be addressed.  The easiest 
subject to cover included the historical aspects of early satellite programs 
and the integration of civilian agencies into an only-military and IC only 
172 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis (Los Angeles, CA: CQ Press, 2012). 
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association.  From a technical aspect there is a trove of information from 
government, academia, and industry sources; the complexity of science 
involved the significant advancements in system’s capability in a very 
short amount of time.  A topic of major intricacy in comparison to history 
and technology was the vast array of legal statutes relating to the use of 
national assets, and their impact to privacy and civil liberty statutes.  
Step 3. Includes identifying alternative approaches or solutions to address the 
problem.  The LE community often has sporadic satellite imagery support 
from the CAC.  A problem with this approach includes the inability for 
local LE to acquire data unless a high profile event is occurring, for 
example a natural or manmade disaster.  A solution presented and enacted 
within DHS was the establishment of the NAO, an organization that would 
work more directly with the LE.  Another option that is routinely used, 
especially at the local level, is the use of imagery data direct from 
commercial satellite providers.   
Step 4. Established the evaluative process that will be used to compare and 
contrast policy alternatives.  A core element in the process will be to 
identify essentials that play a major role in each policy option, and identify 
individual pros, cons, and an eventual grading matrix that can ultimately 
rank options.  At a minimum, alternatives will need to take into 
consideration key elements to include legislative support, legal 
complexities, likely cost, and ease to implement. 
Step 5. Taking into consideration the variables from the previous steps, projects 
an outcome of each policy option.  Inherently the most complex of steps, it 
is in this area where lessons learned and necessary rating information is 
compiled.  This thesis will identity three potential options; to generalize: 
1) can a mission be accomplished with an existing office with 
supplemental funding to further support LE, 2) can a shut down office, 
previously established to provide surveillance support directly to LE, be 
reopened to continue its mission, and 3) in order to eliminate bureaucratic 
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entanglements, which is unfortunately associated with government 
programs, could more streamlined tasking be accomplished through the 
use of private satellite servers? 
Step 6. After conducting an analysis of each policy option, identifies the tradeoffs 
that each idea presents.  Like any exercise in the analysis of multiple 
activities, benefits and drawbacks will be identified.  Though it would be 
easy for all the positive qualities to be lumped in one option thus making 
the policy analysis option easy, this is all too often not the case.  This 
process will identify a range from workable elements to barriers that will 
be the key to narrowing the policy option ranking. 
Step 7. Consists of taking all the background data and conducting an analysis of 
all the options presented.  
Step 8. Provides a background of all options, a thorough analysis of each, and 
ultimately an optimum policy choice. 
B. POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS 
There exist, in present and past programs, multiple options that can be explored 
where lessons learned and mistakes encountered have occurred.  The analysis 
investigated three policy options that could support LE operations; one being an existing 
federal program, the second being a former federal program, and the third being a 
nongovernment owned activity. 
1. Policy Options 
The following are three concepts that were explored.  Option one consists of 
supplementing the CAC to further support LE, option two consists of reestablishing the 
now defunct NAO, and option three would consist of eliminating altogether government 
support, with the exception of disaster management, and having the duty of imagery 
collection through commercial providers managed at the lowest LE level.  All choices 
have varying degrees of pros and cons; in addition all need to take into consideration a 
level of legislative, public, and LE support to be viable for success.  Key elements of 
likely success also included: 
 56 
• the ability to quickly acquire imagery data with minimal bureaucratic 
issues 
• a greater use of all satellite systems, both government and commercial 
• a system that would include imagery analysis support 
• a legal oversight system mechanism 
• program transparency 
a. Policy Option 1: Further Supplement the CAC to Support LE 
One approach would be to maintain satellite operations and coordination 
within the federal government realm using the CAC as the sole LE provider.  The CAC 
currently provides scientific and disaster management imagery to requesting activities 
using the USGS as the principle conduit for both military and IC national asset resources.  
This service is a proven and vital function and could be expanded to accommodate 
mission specific LE activities to include criminal investigation and operational planning. 
Individual agencies can often draw imagery information directly from 
web-based commercial sources, and more often than not this data is adequate; however, 
though useful the imagery is likely dated.173  Often the success of a law enforcement 
activity or operation is dependent on the currency of the resources available; GIS sources 
to include both area specific mapping and imagery.  An additional support function, 
which the CAC readily maintains, would include: 
1. Imagery Analyses: this activity would provide imagery analysis to 
include both urban and rural topographic interpretation and 
characterization 
2. Legal Analysis: this activity would provide support in the legal 
compliance of imagery use 
3. Technical Aid: this activity would provide organizational 
recommendations, training, and assistance in establishing in-house 
GIS activities 
173 Though updated periodically, Google Earth data is typically one to three years old. Google, 
“Google Earth Frequently Asked Question,” last modified 2013, accessed August 22, 2013, 
https://support.google.com/earth/answer/187961?hl=en. 
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To consolidate imagery request at the most local level, a GIS request system will 
be studied and considered where LE activities can coordinate their individual request 
through respective Fusion Centers or in the case of large jurisdictions directly with the 
CAC. 
b. Option 2: Reestablish the National Applications Office 
The second approach would be to reestablish the NAO, which was 
shutdown in 2009, and reassume the role of a central facilitator of imagery support.  The 
organization was specifically established to act as an LE clearing house for national asset 
data under the umbrella of DHS.   
The circumstances of the NAO’s short life span was the result of  DHS’s 
inability to be properly establish the activity from the very beginning174; however, its 
overall mission was innovative in concept and attempted to make available the most 
advanced tools in the government arsenal to the LE community.  Unlike the CAC, whose 
principle support was geared more towards the scientific community and emergency 
service, the NAO was designed specifically to assist LE.   
Similar to the CAC; in addition to providing imagery data, ancillary 
support would also include imagery analysis, legal analysis, and technical aid.   
Another item to consider is moving the activity to a DHS LE conscious 
directorate.  The NAO was originally housed within the DHS Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis Directorate; though in some sectors the use and application of satellite imagery 
can be more associated in an intelligence activity, it should have been placed in a 
complimentary LE-based directorate; a more appropriate directorate would be the Office 





174 Best and Elsea, Satellite Surveillance: Domestic Issues, 7–8. 
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organizational function is to coordinate with LE activities between DHS and “federal, 
state, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector partners by collecting and fusing 
information from a variety of sources.”175   
c. Policy Option 3: Make Greater use of Commercial Providers 
An option not explored as an institutional source, but routinely used on an 
as need basis from a city or municipality standpoint, is to make greater use of commercial 
satellite providers.  With the exception of readily available streaming data, which in 
emergency can be collected either by aerial or unmanned aircraft system (UAS) 
surveillance, the private industry can provide ample imagery and sensor data for multiple 
uses and customers.  For example, DigitalGlobe is a major provider of imagery services 
with a fleet of GeoEye-1, GeoEye-2, IKONOS, and Worldview176 imagery satellites; the 
technologies provided are almost equal to government agencies177.   
The collection of satellite imagery data would be geared towards taking 
greater advantage of commercial services, as opposed to government resources. This 
would put the onus on the specific LE activity to facilitate individual imagery requests 
directly with the satellite provider.  Several imagery resources, including at-cost and free 
web-based services with the requisite GIS analysis packages, are readily available.  
Though information may be dated, often it is current enough and has more than adequate 
resolution to be used for planning purposes. 
Removing the federal government and empowering LE at the lowest level 
will lessen excessive bureaucratic formalities, reduce the impact of some legal issues, 
and, in comparison to federal government collection efforts, may in fact reduce the 
specter of infringement of privacy rights. 
175 Department of Homeland Security, “About the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning,” 
last modified 2013, accessed November 19, 2013, http://www.dhs.gov/about-office-operations-
coordination-and-planning. 
176 DigitalGlobe, “Satellite Resources,” June 2013, http://www.digitalglobe.com/resources/satellite-
information. 
177 Weber and O’Connell, Alternative Futures. 
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2. Policy Options Grading Criteria 
The three policy options to be investigated were graded using the following 
criteria: 1) legislative support, 2) legal issues, 3) projected cost, and 4) ease to implement.  
The details of each criterion are presented below. 
a. Legislative Support 
Legislative support would gauge the likely confidence of legislators who 
would enable the proposed program to secure funding and be sustained.  There are some 
questions to consider, such as: What level of legislative acceptance or resistance can be 
expected?  Will past program successes or failures impact future proposals?  If legislative 
support is lacking, a low grade can be anticipated or determined, due to proposal 
complexity, controversy, skepticism, etc.  In contrast a high grade may be anticipated or 
determined, if legislative support is positive due to transparency, constructive 
documentation, public acceptance, etc.. 
b. Legal Issues 
The legal issues criterion identifies whether a suggested policy option 
solution would garner questionable or excessive legal scrutiny.  Several questions should 
be considered: How many legal statutes will need to be considered?  What level of 
privacy and civil rights issues will arise?  Will imagery data collected be admissible in 
the courts?  How many challenges can be expected?  A low grade can be expected if it is 
anticipated or determined that vital legal tenets will not be addressed or pushed to their 
maximum acceptable limitations.  On the other hand, a high grade can be expected if all 
applicable legal tenets are covered and well within acceptable boundaries. 
c. Projected Cost 
The projected cost criterion anticipates the level of resources that will be 
necessary to enact the policy option. Some questions for consideration are: Will new 
funding be required for a new organization or supplemental funding to an existing 
activity?  Will there be buy in from other activities or will a single program have to incur 
the full financial burden?  If a program cost will exceed the options utility then a low 
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grade will be assigned.  In contrast, a high grade can be anticipated if costs are 
manageable or if there is cost sharing from other organizations. 
d. Ease to Implement 
The final criterion is ease to implement, which identifies the level of ease 
in enacting the policy option.  A couple of questions should be considered: Will it be 
necessary to establish a new activity or modify an existing one?  Is an infrastructure and 
support system in place to accommodate the policy option?  If there is minimal, existing 
infrastructure to support the option it will receive a low grade.  However, a high grade 
will be given if there is existing infrastructure to support the option. 
C. POLICY OPTIONS EVALUATION 
The three policy options are as follows: Policy Option 1: Further supplement the 
Civil Applications Committee to support LE, Policy Option 2: Reestablish the National 
Applications Office, and Policy Option 3: Make greater use of commercial providers.  An 
evaluation was conducted of the three policy options utilizing the policy options grading 
criteria.  The details of each option in relationship to the established grading criteria are 
presented below. 
1. Policy Option 1: Further Supplement the Civil Applications 
Committee Evaluation 
In addition to disaster support, can LE be further supported if additional funding 
and resources were provided to the Civilian Applications Committee?  An evaluation of 
Policy Option 1 in relationship to the grading criteria is discussed. 
a. Policy Option 1: Legislative Support 
A benefit that the CAC has, along with its parent agency the USGS, is it 
inherently does not work under a veil of secrecy similar to its military or IC counterparts.  
The imagery that USGS collects is principally for scientific purposes, a byproduct of 




and National Map are clear examples of where tax dollars are being spent and provide a 
daily example of access to free mapping and imagery for anyone with web access—LE 
included. 
As a whole, the indirect legislative support may stem from the CAC’s 
parent agency to internally support it as a conduit for the LE community in disaster 
monitoring and management.  For example, though federal budgets are waning across the 
board, the USGS Core Science Systems, National Geospatial Program budget, which 
houses the National Map, has had an increasing budget of $63 million in 2012 to a $72 
million justification in 2014.178 
b. Policy Option 1: Legal Issues 
An element that works with the CAC with regards to the law, particularly 
constitutional privacy as well as PCA compliance, is its specific mission profile when it 
comes to coordination of services with the military and IC.  The activity is primarily 
designed to support civil agencies and academia in earth science programs and 
subsequently support policy makers in related and collaborative matters.  Because of the 
program’s direct scientific-based missions, it simply does not garner the legal scrutiny. In 
addition, the CAC currently does not conduct criminal LE investigation support.  What 
the CAC does provide is emergency service support for natural and manmade disaster 
events.  The satellite data it provides is used by emergency managers for pre and post 
disaster planning; the complexities of surveillance legalities do not fall within this realm. 
c. Policy Option 1: Projected Cost 
From an emergency management perspective, the CAC is vital for 
providing satellite imagery for states and local jurisdictions in pre-planning and post 
disaster support. The program has been maintaining this function since 1975.179  
However, though this function is designed to support LE, strictly in terms of emergency 
178 United States Geological Survey, Budget Justifications and Performance Information Fiscal Year 
2014 (Washington, DC: United States Departmrnt of the Interior, 2013), accessed September 1, 2013, 
http://www.usgs.gov/budget/2014/greenbook/2014_greenbook.pdf. 
179 USGS,”Civil Applications Committee Factsheet.” 
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management and not criminal investigation.  In addition, the service is not extended 
towards LE operational planning, including rescue team, active shooter, or similar 
scenario development.  
Despite the increase in the USGS Core Science Systems budget, the 
CAC’s resources has in fact been consistently waning from $2 million in both 2010 to 
2012180 to manage the activity, to an agency justification of -$576,000, with a loss of two 
full time employee billets in 2014.181  Another organization shift was in the 2010 budget 
language, which specified that none of the funding, with the exception of disaster 
support, was to be used for LE purposes.182 
In 2007, there was a comprehensive redesign of generating a national 
imagery repository, referred to as the Imagery for the Nation (IFTN), 183 in which the 
USDA and the USGS funded the development of a cost benefit analysis for the necessary 
satellite and aerial imagery to update, enhance, and standardize a national imagery 
program. The National States Geographic Information Council (NSGIC) was tasked to 
prepare a notional plan.  The NSGIC organizational mission is to provide a coordination 
activity for state and local government agencies to acquire and manage up to date 
imagery requirements in accordance to the National Spatial Data Infrastructure 
(NDSI).184   
The IFTN presented four options,185 which included a variation of 1) full 
federal funding, 2) 50/50 federal and state funding, 3) imagery at one meter resolution for 
180 Richard M. Jones, “FYI: The AIP Bulletin of Science Policy News, House FY 2010 USGS 
Appropriations Bill,” June 25, 2009, American Institute of Physics, accessed June 22, 2013, 
http://www.aip.org/fyi/2009/082.html. 
181 United States Geological Survey, Budget Justifications and Performance, B-57. 
182 Richard M. Jones, “FYI: The AIP Bulletin of Science Policy News, House FY 2010 USGS 
Appropriations Bill,” June 25, 2009, accessed June 22, 2013,http://www.aip.org/fyi/2009/082.html. 
183 National States Geographic Information Council, Imagery for the Nation, Cost Benefit Analysis 
(Bel Air, MD: National States Geographic Information Council, 2007), accessed September 9, 2013, 
http://www.nsgic.org/public_resources/Imagery_for_the_Nation_IFTN_CBA.pdf . 
184 The goal of this program, which is managed by the Federal Geographic Data Committee, is to 
provide a means of coordination among agencies to improve mapping and imagery standardizations, data 
quality, reduce cost, establish LE relationships along all sectors, and make data readily available to the 
public at http://www.fgdc.gov/nsdi/nsdi.html. 
185 National States Geographic Information Council, Imagery for the Nation, 2–5. 
 63 
                                                 
the entire nation, 4) imagery at one foot resolution for the rural/urban environment, and 
5) imagery at 6 inch resolution in the urban environment.  To specify: 
1. IFTN Option 1186 
a. Proposed cost: estimated $1.38 billion for 10 years to aerial and 
satellite imagery provider support. 
b. 100 percent federally funded base line and annual update of 1-
meter imagery for the entire nation; Hawaii will receive a base line 
and update every three years; Alaska will receive a base line and 
update every five years.   
c. 100 percent federally funded 1-foot resolution imagery, updated 
every three years, for states east of the Mississippi. 
d. 100 percent federally funded 1-foot resolution imagery, updated 
every three years, for all counties west of the Mississippi with a 
population center greater than 25 people per square mile. 
e. 50 percent federal matching funds will be available to agencies to 
acquire 6-inch imagery data to city areas that have a population 
greater than 50,000 or a population density of 1,000 people per 
square mile. 
2. IFTN Option 2187 
a. Proposed cost: estimated $1.73 billion for 10 years to aerial and 
satellite imagery provider support. 
b. 100 percent federally funded base line and annual update of 1-
meter imagery for the entire nation; Hawaii will receive a base line 
and an update every three years; Alaska will receive a base line 
and an update every five years.   
c. 100 percent federally funded 1-foot resolution imagery, updated 
every 3 years, for all states and Hawaii. 
186 Ibid., 4–5. 
187 Ibid., 4–8. 
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d. 100 percent federally funded 1-foot resolution imagery, updated 
every three years, for all counties in Alaska with a population 
center greater than 25 people per square mile. 
e. 50 percent federal matching funds will be available to agencies to 
acquire 6-inch imagery data to city areas that have a population 
greater than 50,000 or a population density of 1,000 people per 
square mile. 
3. IFTN Option 3188 
a. Proposed cost: estimated $1.71 billion for ten years to aerial and 
satellite imagery provider support. 
b. 100 percent federally funded base line and annual update of 1-
meter imagery for the entire nation; Hawaii will receive a base line 
and an update every three years; Alaska will receive a base line 
and an update every five years.   
c. 50 percent mandatory cost share 1-foot resolution imagery, 
updated every three years, for all states and Hawaii. 
d. 50 percent mandatory cost share 1-foot resolution imagery, 
updated every 3 years, for all counties in Alaska with a population 
center greater than 25 people per square mile. 
e. 50 percent mandatory cost share to agencies to acquire 6-inch 
imagery data to city areas that have a population greater than 
50,000 or a population density of 1,000 people per square mile. 
4. IFTN Option 4189 
a. Proposed cost: estimated $1.55 billion for ten years to aerial and 
satellite imagery provider support. 
b. 100 percent federally funded base line and annual update of 1-
meter imagery for the entire nation; Hawaii will receive a base line 
188 Ibid., 4–11 
189 Ibid., 4–14. 
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and an update every three years; Alaska will receive a base line 
and an update every five years.   
c. 50 percent federally funded 1-foot resolution imagery, updated 
every three years, for all states and Hawaii. 
d. 50 percent federally funded 1-foot resolution imagery, updated 
every three years, for all counties in Alaska with a population 
center greater than 25 people per square mile. 
e. 50 percent federal matching funds will be available to agencies to 
acquire 6-inch imagery data to city areas that have a population 
greater than 50,000 or a population density of 1,000 people per 
square mile. 
On July 2010 the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) published a 
presolicitation190 to gather request for information (RFI) data from prospective of 
interested companies to support the IFTN program; however, as of February 11, 2013, the 
results of the RFI has not been publicly available.191 
Another sign of waning funds and an area of potential concern for imagery 
support, particularly in the civilian government sector, is the lack of new earth imaging 
satellite programs being deployed, such as USGS, NOAA, and NASA.  Taking into 
consideration specific satellite support, tasking, life spans, and proposed mission 
coverage, all of the programs will be lacking in earthbound coverage in comparison to 
optimum replacements.192 To summarize, earth observation is on a slow but steady state 
of decline.193 Multiple circumstances are to blame. These range from operational, scope 
changes and over consolidation of missions; however, the key element to all issues is a 
declining budget and the necessity to pick and choose prioritized missions as oppose to 
190 Federal Business Opportunity, “Imagery for the Nation, Solicitation Number: ACR-2010-01,” July 
15, 2010, Federal Business Opportunity, accessed July 17, 2013, 
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=5686bd9200cb1729a7fcd44b. 
191 National States Geographic Information Council, Imagery for the Nation. 
192 National Research Council, Earth Science and Applications from Space: A Midterm Assessment of 
NASA’s Implementation of the Decadal Survey (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2012), 45–48. 
193 Ibid. 
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making accommodation for all conceivable activities.  Even with priorities potentially 
being met, perceived lesser yet equally important missions may be lost with no plans to 
fill the gaps. 
Figure 13 depicts the future state of affairs of planned, funded, and unfunded 
missions, and associated equipment requirements, in comparison to optimistic scenarios 
that will provide the actual optimum coverage required.  Items in blue are funded; 
unfunded items in pink are optimistic scenarios that will cover existing programs and 
provide overlap for multiple earth science programs.  As the Figure 13 presents, there is a 
clear gap between satellite tasking and the available resources to accomplish them. 
 
Figure 13.  Future NASA/NOAA Missions Anticipated194 
 
194 National Research Council, Earth Science and Applications from Space, 46. 
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d. Policy Option 1: Ease to Implement 
Multiple earth science programs have been managed through CAC 
programs.  In addition, the CAC has made available to the public, via multiple websites, 
both imagery and mapping data that can be applied towards simple mapping for general 
purpose use as well as more sophisticated imagery and sensor data collection for earth 
science research.  The National Map195 viewer is a web based downloader that provides 
free mapping and imagery to the public.  The products that are provided include U.S. 
topographical maps as well as historical charts.  Data integrated into the viewer includes 
elevation, orthoimagery, hydrography, geographic names, boundaries, transportation, 
structures, and land cover.  Another mapping site that the CAC provides is the GFP, a 
comprehensive collection of earth science experiments has collected more than 4000 one 
meter resolution images since 2008.196  The data collected for these efforts are readily 
available to all users and is available through the CAC’s GFP website.197 
USGS, the CAC’s parent agency, next to the Department of Defense, is 
one of the largest government providers of mapping and imagery data. The agency has 
the equipment to collect the information, the personnel to analyze, and the archiving 
capability to both store and distribute it.  Though in its current package, minimal USGS 
data may be available for urban topography down to the half meter resolution range, the 
web-based infrastructure that the USGS maintains could conceivably house more detailed 
imagery and mapping information. 
2. Policy Option 2: Reestablish the National Applications Office 
Evaluation 
Despite past history and issues, could LE at all levels be better served if the 
National Application Office (NAO) was reestablished?  An evaluation of Policy Option 2 
in relationship to the grading criteria is presented. 
195 The National Map Viewer website is accessible at http://nationalmap.gov/viewer.html. 
196 Molnia, “Monitoring Change as it Happens.” 
197 The CAC Global Fiducials Program website is accessible through http://gfl.usgs.gov/. 
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a. Policy Option 2: Legislative Support 
The NAO was established on the heels on 9/11.  Although the CAC 
traditionally provided LE with disaster support satellite imagery, the George W. Bush 
administration proposed the establishment of an organization that would utilize the same 
national assets used in disaster assistance to support law enforcement.198  As a result, the 
NAO was conceived to take over the LE portion within the CAC’s mission.  Thus in 
2007, the NAO was launched and placed within the purview of DHS.199  However, 
though significant coordination occurred between the CAC, the Department of Interior, 
and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in establishing the NAO, DHS did not 
adequately announce the new activity to either Congress or the American public.200 
With regards to the new organization’s establishment and initial funding, 
the DHS administration indicated that the “Intelligence and Appropriations oversight 
committees have been briefed and approved the reprogramming.”201  However, upon 
later query, it became more confusing between DHS and Congress from where the actual 
NAO appropriation derived.  In a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report relating 
to the domestic use of satellite surveillance, a potential link indicated:202 
The programming in question probably involved a transfer of funds from 
an account under the control of the DNI to the DHS. Funding for the 
Office of the DNI is not part of Homeland Security appropriations 
legislation but is provided in intelligence appropriations included in 
defense appropriations legislation. It is possible that this funding was 
provided in classified annexes of defense legislation that was not brought 
to the attention of the House Homeland Security Committee or to the 
Homeland Security Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. 
The NAO’s initial funding immediately became questionable. Wherever 
the funding derived from, or if the actual communication was possibly in an errant 
198 Allen, “Why the Country Needs the National Application Office.” 
199 Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: National Applications Office,” August 15, 2007, 
National Security Archive, accessed October 15, 2012, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB229/43.pdf. 
200 Best and Elsea, Satellite Surveillance: Domestic Issues, 7. 
201 Department of Homeland Security. “Fact Sheet: National Applications Office.” 
202 Best and Elsea, Satellite Surveillance: Domestic Issues, 7. 
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classified annex, it was apparent that that the House Committee on Homeland Security 
had not formally approved the action.203  Though it seem there was a significant amount 
of discussion between key agencies with regards to the NAO’s mission, function, and 
funding stream, key activities were left out, in particular, the House Homeland Security 
Committee and the Homeland Security Subcommittee of the Appropriations 
Committee.204  From the very beginning, from a congressional perspective, the NAO was 
doomed to fail.  To further add to its turbulent beginnings, the NAO management failed 
to establish a workable standard operating procedure on how specific requests would be 
routed, verified for legal compliance, managed, and disseminated.205 
For two years, NAO had direct access to satellite operations and analysis 
to provide natural disaster and law enforcement support, an extension of what the CAC 
was already doing. At the end of the day, the NAO was perceived as a redundant mission. 
On June 23, 2009, DHS Secretary Napolitano shut the office down.206  From a legislative 
standpoint, the NAO’s failure was the result of poor planning on program development 
from the very start. 
b. Policy Option 2: Legal Issues 
Unlike the CAC, whose collection missions consisted of primarily 
scientific data gathering (an activity that does not inherently garner significant legal 
oversight), the NAO was the complete opposite.  Despite that the activity established a 
mechanism to ensure legal oversight with regards to constitutional, privacy, and civil 
liberty legal tenets, it was later determined by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) 
that the NAO had significant shortcomings.  Key findings that GAO determined 
included:207 
203 Ibid. 
204 Jeffrey T. Richelson,”The Office That Never Was: The Failed Creation of the National 
Applications Office,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence (2010): 79–81. 
205 Turning Spy Satellites On The Homeland, 56–57. 
206 Department of Homeland Security, “Secretary Napolitano Announces Decision.” 
207 GOA, National Applications Office Certification Review.  
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1. DHS in principle established a mechanism to ensure legal compliance; 
however they did not resolve application procedures with regards to LE 
request for imagery collection. 
2. DHS set up a system of determining legal review of satellite information 
request, but did not have a data management system in place. 
3. Though later rectified, DHS initially failed to announce establishment of 
the NAO to the public in accordance to the Privacy Act of 1974.208 
The NAO set up a system to ensure the protection of privacy and civil 
liberties, as well as PCA, EO 12333 and, albeit late, the Privacy Act of 1974 compliance.  
In addition, DHS maintained an internal oversight activity that included the DHS 
Inspector General, DHS Chief Privacy Officer, and the DHS Officer for Civil Rights and 
Civil Liberties.  The activity also was established with external oversight from the Civil 
Protection Officer for the Office for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.209 
Though working within the confines of the law, the principle shortfall that 
the NAO had was a lack of having unconditional legal and procedural details established 
on an issue so sensitive from the very start; this should have been the very first step of 
establishing the organization.  With the mass legal scrutiny that was drawn from multiple 
vectors, including privacy and civil rights organizations, Congress, and the general public 
as a whole, the likelihood of even the slightest notion of reactivating the NAO succeeding 
is remote. 
c. Policy Option 2: Projected Cost 
Due to the classified nature of the NAO budget, minimal, if any, cost 
information is available on the base program, let alone the management of the office 
operation.210  A source of startup funding, though not specific, was likely derived from a 
208 The Privacy Act of 1974 requires all agencies to disclose the existence of a personal information 
data collection systems; this information is typically published in the Federal Register. 
209 Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: National Applications Office.” 
210 Associated Press, “Homeland Secretary to Kill Domestic Sateliite Program Begun by Bush 
Administration,” June 22, 2009, accessed August 21, 2013, http://peteking.house.gov/media-center/in-the-
news/associated-press-homeland-secretary-to-kill-domestic-satellite-program. 
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congressional $634 billion partial funding budget line within the DNI to support the 
establishment of the NAO.211   
Lacking even basic cost data regarding the program’s original budget, the 
best that can be done is to base an NAO restart budget comparable to existing programs 
that maintain a similar mission of facilitating imagery satellite request from outside 
activities.  Traditional activities within the military, IC, NASA, USGS, and NOAA that 
both own and operate satellite programs cannot provide an optimum budgetary starting 
point for a similar activity within DHS.  The reason being was the NAO program layout 
was to be a clearing house for LE requests only; LE is neither an owner nor operator of 
space borne systems. DHS was not going to be responsible for the research, 
manufacturing, launching, ground based operations, or the multitude of other tasks 
associated with managing such equipment. 
The closest activity that is somewhat comparable to the original tasks of 
the NAO as a facilitator for external LE request and can provide an inference of program 
details is the organization mentioned in Policy Option 1 of this thesis, the CAC.  Though 
not an owner or operator of USGS satellites let alone national assets, the CAC operated 
as a clearing house to both the scientific and, when it pertained to disaster support, LE 
community.  In Policy Option 1, two budgetary numbers were mentioned: 1) the IFTN 
proposal, which entailed a 10-year program ranging from $1.38 billion to $1.73 billion, 
and 2) the 2010 to 2012 budget of approximately $2 million per year to operate the 
office, facilitate the committee, and maintain the basic mission.  As previously 
mentioned, the IFTN RFI has yet to be considered and a reestablished NAO would likely 
require a greater office budget. The CAC, with its existing budget, already maintains an 
established relationship and infrastructure with military and IC providers.  In contrast, a 
new NAO would necessitate establishing relationships with the same activities from 
scratch. 
211 Siobahn Gorman, “Satellite-Surveillance Program to Begin Despite Privacy Concerns,” The Wall 
Street Journal, October 1, 2008, accessed June 15, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122282336428992785.html?mod=fox_australian. 
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d. Policy Option 2: Ease to Implement 
During one of the first discussions conducted by the House of 
Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security on September 6, 2007, a key dissenter 
from a list of many, included Barry Steinhardt, Director of Technology and Liberty 
Programs for the American Civil Liberties union (ACLU).  Though Mr. Steinhardt did 
not recommend shutting down the NAO on the grounds of civil liberty and privacy 
concerns, he did ask the committee to think about the organization and the public 
concerns. Recommendations he presented included:212 
1. a suspension on the on all NAO activity until Congress is satisfied that all 
its raised concerns during the hearing have been answered 
2. that the suspension will not be lifted until Congress says so 
3. that Congress should not rescind this suspension until it is confident that 
legal checks and balances are in place, as well as clear rules regarding the 
NAO’s operation 
4. that the Chief Privacy Officer of the Department of Homeland Security 
becomes an independent activity 
The NAO maintained an office within DHS and a rudimentary request and 
collection process, albeit by no mean complete; however, unlike the CAC, the 
organization lacked a true infrastructure to support imagery data management.  The 
circumstances are obvious—the organization simply was not around long enough to 
develop, and what little time it had in the primacy of its operation was spent managing a 
myriad of administrative issues that should have been in place before the office 
opened.213  The lack of an adequate office infrastructure to coordinate task from the 
military, the IC, and the LE community was an obstacle that if given resources and time 
could have conceivably been fixed.  However, the inability to assuage the public of legal 
scrutiny and the failure to eliminate the “big brother” label all but killed any future 
reimplementation. 
212 Turning Spy Satellites On The Homeland, 41–42. 
213 Richelson,”The Office That Never Was,” 65–118. 
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3. Policy Option 3: Make Greater use of Commercial Providers
Evaluation
Would LE be better off acquiring its imagery data requirements themselves as 
oppose to relying of federal sources?  An evaluation of Policy Option 3 in relationship to 
the grading criteria is offered. 
a. Policy Option 3: Legislative Support
With federal resources dwindling resulting in waning support for all 
programs, Congress as always is tasked to investigate programs traditionally funded, 
identify legitimate needs, prioritize, and eventually reduce or cut resources all together. 
As previously mentioned, the CAC itself had significant resources removed to a point 
that, with the exception of providing disaster management imagery, local LE would be 
cut off from all other support. 
Since post 9-11, through multiple grant programs, the federal government 
has provided funding to both state and local police jurisdictions into the billions of 
dollars; however, those resources are dwindling.  Similar to pre 9-11, though the federal 
government will continue support in local LE indirectly, the direct support in local 
operations will be significantly reduced; funding and managing departments at the lowest 
level is returning.   
Like every conceivable service that a local police department will incur, 
the notion of managing its own GIS activity, including imagery collection and analysis is 
not foreign.  The availability of both for cost, as well as free, imagery collection services 
is very apparent and provides an obvious benefit in lieu of an expensive government 
program.  Legislatures and the citizenry will welcome the cost reduction. 
b. Policy Option 3: Legal Issues
The use of any imagery satellite capability, commercial included, will 
always warrant consideration of existing laws, especially when it pertains to privacy or 
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civil liberties.  Ensuring the compliance of all constitutional tenets will remain the same 
no matter who the owner or operator is.   
Key issues that will need consideration are the use of imagery at cost 
versus free.  Many for free services are more than adequate for establishing an awareness 
of the community served. In addition, they provide an extra data set for emergency action 
plans.  However, a key element that requires thought with regards to using open source 
data is its potential admissibility in a court of law.  Unlike the data options presented by 
more formal or for cost services, free data is exactly that—material though useful, but 
likely lacking specific collection details with regard collection time, resolution, system 
type used, altitude, original collection resolution, and a host of other issues that can be 
argued in a court of law. 
Free or not, one key benefit, if not the principle one of all, is the collection 
or use of imagery from commercial owned and operated systems, not under the purview 
of either the military or IC, and its exemption from PCA, EO 12333, and a host of other 
federal restrictions.214 
c. Policy Option 3: Projected Cost 
Government and industry are ready suppliers of imagery both free and at 
cost.  In comparison to the past use of aerial surveillance, the cost associated with 
collecting satellite imagery within a jurisdiction is significantly cheaper.  Depending on 
an agency budget and the specific imagery required there are multiple sources where data 
can be collected.  Shown in Figure 14, Google Earth is a free imagery collection service 
and GIS package that typically updates its imagery from one to three years,215 a resource 
more than adequate for a common user.  If current or greater sensor data is required, 
private users can make use of for-cost satellite providers. A sample of for-cost service is 
presented in Figure 15. 
214 Korody, Satellite Surveillance Within U.S. Borders, 1641. 
215 Google, “Google Earth Frequently Asked Question,” last modified 2013, accessed August 22, 
2013, https://support.google.com/earth/answer/187961?hl=en. 
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Figure 14.  Google Earth216 
216 Google Earth, image, accessed August 14, 2013, http://www.google.com/earth/. 
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Figure 15.  Sample Cost for Custom Imagery Request217 
 
217 Walsh Environmental Scientist and Engineers, “Comparison of Satellite Imagery Used for 
Environmental Projects,” Walsh Environmental Services, last modified 2013, accessed May 2013, 
http://www.walshenv.com/files/satellite_imagery_comparison.pdf. 
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d. Policy Option 3: Ease to Implement 
For this option, the police users would be setting up their imagery 
requirement direct with a commercial provider, in contrast to coordinating with the 
federal government whose own collection requirements may take precedence over local 
LE.  Add to that, the level of scrutiny that comes with the use of national assets, working 
with a commercial provider will be easier and quicker. 
Most prepared police activities likely maintain or have access to a 
rudimentary GIS capability within their department. With multiple services available 
from direct providers, the ease to implement an imagery capability beyond a basic 
mapping capability only requires a computer, internet access, and a credit card.218   
D. POLICY OPTIONS ASSESSMENT 
Through Bardach’s eight steps,219 an assessment can be conducted citing both 
pros and cons of all three options. 
1. Policy Option 1 Assessment: Further Supplement the CAC to Support 
LE 
That the CAC is a vital organization from a macro perspective is very apparent. 
Its principle aim is coordinating the use of national assets for the purpose of supporting 
scientific efforts. In addition, it is a key element in providing vital imagery for both 
natural and manmade disaster management support. The USGS National Map and GFP 
viewer are very useful tools with regards to collecting archived mapping and imagery 
data. However, from a micro perspective and with regards to supporting LE at the lowest 




218 Google Earth Pro a higher fidelity version of Google Earth is offered for $399 annually, available 
http://www.google.com/intl/en/enterprise/mapsearth/products/earthpro.html?utm_source=google&utm_me
dium=cpc&utm_name=AMER-GEO-US-earthpro&gclid=CIK4kYrawboCFUyd4AodzlwAiw. 
219 Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis. 
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A. From a legislative support perspective 
1. the CAC provides a vital conduit for multiple users to have access 
to national assets 
2. maximizing program cross pollination, by using national assets, 
eliminates the need to add more like-programs and systems thus 
reduces redundancies 
3. since 2010, the CAC budget has been dwindling  
4. though very helpful with supporting environment initiatives and 
disaster management, minimal to no direct support for criminal 
investigation is provided 
 Assessment: Neutral 
B. From a legal issues perspective 
1. the CAC does not engage in LE criminal investigation support 
2. though the CAC must conform to all privacy and civil right laws, 
its principle mission of scientific collection, as opposed to direct 
LE support, does not garner significant legal scrutiny 
3. the CAC still has to operate the program within all tenets of law 
especially when utilizing national assets: 1) Constitutional, 2) 
Executive Order 12333, and 3) PCA 
 Assessment: Neutral 
C. From a cost perspective 
1. the CAC budget has been waning into the negative numbers 
2. departing personnel within the CAC are not being replaced 
3. future government satellite launches for earth monitoring are on 
the downswing 
4. a 2007 USGS and USDA feasibility study on establishing a 
comprehensive Imagery for the Nation Program220 had a price tag 
in the vicinity of $1.38 to $1.73 billion to establish and maintain 
for 10 years 
220 National States Geographic Information Council, Imagery for the Nation. 
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 Assessment: Negative 
D. From an Ease to implement perspective 
1. the CAC, through its parent agency, maintains both an imagery 
satellite operations, collections, and archiving apparatus 
2. the CAC works closely with both military and IC activities, as well 
as their respective support apparatus 
3. maintaining both the National Map and GFP data base provides a 
public access mechanism for the public and LE to acquire mapping 
and imagery data 
4. a web-based infrastructure is in place to add more services if 
necessary 
 Assessment: Positive  
2. Policy Option 2 Assessment: Reestablish the National Applications 
Office 
Though established with positive intensions in a post 9-11 environment to support 
LE, the NAO failed to take into consideration several programmatic elements early into 
its development. Despite the NAO being established with safeguards with regards to 
privacy, civil rights, and PCA concerns, it was apparent that the oversight mechanism 
established did not assuage the citizenry and that significant confidence was lacking as to 
its true purpose.  
A. From a legislative perspective: 
1. DHS failed to formally inform the public of the NAO’s 
establishment 
2. DHS failed to formally inform Congress of the NAO’s 
establishment 
3. though classified, it was hard to ascertain where the initial NAO 
funding came from 
4. there was a complete breakdown of communications between the 
NAO, key committees of Congress and Congress as a whole 
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5. though the office was in operation, the NAO lacked key operating 
procedures with regards to the management of working both 
internally and externally, in particular facilitating LE request 
6. even with internal and external oversight, the NAO could not 
convince Congress of its ability to manage the operation in 
complete compliance of privacy, civil liberty, and PCA laws 
7. a program established by one administration could not garner the 
support of an incoming administration  
 Assessment: Negative 
B. From a legal perspective 
1. on paper the NAO followed all the tenets of 1) constitutional, 2) 
statutory authorities and restrictions, and 3) executive branch 
authorities; however, it could not garner the public confidence that 
the activity would be conducted in a consistent legal manner  
2. laws relating to any government surveillance activity is extremely 
complex 
3. a mechanism was never put in place regarding LE use; minimal if 
no information was presented on how this would be accomplished 
4. the level of legal complexity increased because of PCA and EO 
12333 compliance concerns 
 Assessment: Negative 
C. From a cost perspective 
1. minimal cost data was presented for the startup of the NAO, the 
actual initial funding may have been part of a $634 billion DNI 
budget; however, no organizational specifics were provided 
2. the closest government cost estimate for facilitating an LE-like 
satellite imagery and mapping program was the USGS and USDA 
Imagery For The Nation proposal, which had a price tag in the 
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vicinity of $1.38 to $1.73 billion to establish and maintain for 10 
years221 
 Assessment Negative  
 
D. From an ease to implement perspective 
1. the NAO was only a facilitation activity 
2. according to the literature available, the NAO had a minimal 
analysis capability 
3. the NAO had a minimal mapping and imagery distribution 
capability 
4. the NAO had a minimal infrastructure in the short time it was in 
operation 
5. if reestablishment was considered, the activity would be starting 
with no existing capability in place 
 Assessment: Negative 
3. Policy Option Three Assessment: Make Greater use of Commercial 
Assets 
Access to commercial satellite imagery is available to the general public through 
many vectors, with internet providers being the most prevalent. Most services are free; 
however, if an activity requires a greater sensor capability, up to date information, or 
even a dedicated flyby into a specific area, these can be provided at cost.  
A. From a legislative perspective: 
1. the federal legislative process would likely not be involved with 
LE at the local level 
2. minimal local legislative support would be required to support an 
in-house GIS program; the vast amount of imagery is either free or 
at minimal cost 
 Assessment: Positive 
221 As presented in Policy Option1. 
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B. From a legal perspective: 
1. LE will still need to conform to privacy, civil rights, and 
constitutional laws 
2. local LE using commercial imagery, at the lowest jurisdictional 
level, though garnering legal scrutiny will not draw as much in 
comparison to imagery collection at the federal level 
3. the use of commercial imagery will negate the necessity to comply 
with the PCA or EO 12333 
 Assessment: Positive 
C. From a cost perspective: 
1. most commercial imagery is free, or at minimal cost, via the 
internet 
 Assessment: Positive 
D. From an ease to implement perspective: 
1. all that is needed is internet access 
2. an account will be necessary for advanced or for-cost services 
 Assessment: Positive 
E. POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The ability to acquire any surveillance data provides a building block to a 
potential quick alert operation. Vital information to be fed into an action plan, and if 
properly administered and managed an evidentiary tool to be used in a court of law.  
Satellite imagery is a key component that can fill several of these LE requirements and 
more when left to creative users.  Dating back to the notional concept of integrating it 
into disaster management plans as far back as the 1960s, its utility emphasizes its 
emerging practicality, even when the science was very young. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the feasibility of LE gaining more access 
to national asset imagery or a suitable alternative.  As a way to understand programs that 
facilitated civilian efforts, two federally managed activities were explored: the CAC and 
the now defunct NAO.  As an alternative to the two government-based activities, a third 
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option was explored in the form of commercial providers.  All three approaches to 
satellite imagery collection for LE purposes have clear advantages and disadvantages; 
some more than the other. 
Table 1 presents a graphical summary of each policy option in comparison to the 
policy option grading criteria metrics.  During the policy analysis assessment each of the 
four policy option grading criterion was either assigned a rating of positive, which 
represents a grade of 3, a rating of neutral, which represents a grade of 2, or a rating of 
negative, which represents a grade of 1.  To present an example, under the grading 
criteria of legislative support, reestablishing the NAO would be the least effective 
approach with a grade of 1.Conversly, making greater use of commercial providers in the 
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Table 1.   Policy Options Grading Criteria Summary 
Table 2 presents a graphical summary of the total grades of all the policy options 
in relationship to grading criteria as a whole.  As shown, reestablishing the NAO had the 





Policy Option Total Grade 
Option 1: Further supplement the CAC 8 
Option 2: Reestablish the NAO 4 
Option 3: Make greater use of commercial providers 12 
Table 2.   Policy Options Total Grade Summary 
The founders of the NAO, which was designed to support LE at the micro and 
local level in criminal investigation, failed to take into considerations key elements 
during its establishment.  This lack of detail and overconfidence of acceptance drew 
negative scrutiny from many sectors of American society.  Though the activity could 
have been a vital asset, the organization could not escape the veil of distrust, and as far as 
the citizenry was concerned, this was a nontransparent tactic to infringe upon individual 
privacy.  The organization lost its chance to instill even the most remote level of public 
confidence from the very beginning.  As the assessment showed, there were no scores 
above 1; even in the best of circumstances, or the worst in the form of a national 
emergency, a semblance of an NAO-like activity at the federal level would likely never 
be considered for establishment.  For purposes of this assessment, Policy Option 2: 
Reestablish the NAO, would be the least optimum approach to explore. 
The CAC continues to maintain a vital program of supplying the science 
community with valuable imagery collected from national assets.  The dual use of 
utilizing national assets emphasizes the fact that a level of facilitation between the 
military, intelligence, and civilian community does work, especially in the arena of 
disaster preparation and remediation support.  Policy Option 1 graded high on ease to 
implement. The resources that the USGS and CAC provide during emergencies are well 
documented, though the members of the public may not know exactly how imagery is 
used in such events, they do know that this data at the end of the day saves lives and 
property.  Because the organization maintains a large repository of both mapping and 
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imagery data and makes them readily available to the public through the Global Fiducials 
Program and the USGS National Map Downloader and Viewer, it is apparent that a web-
based infrastructure is available. Therefore, the ease of implementing additional resources 
into an existing system would be less complex than an activity starting from anew.  
However, where the CAC scored low, as in most programs, was the likely cost to upgrade 
an existing system and populate it with current imagery data on a regular basis.  The 
National States Geographic Information Council’s, Imagery For The Nation proposal to 
the USDA and USGS was an extremely comprehensive program that was intended and 
designed for multiple users, in particular LE; however, the over one billion dollar cost for 
the effort likely exceeded available federal funding.  Option 1: Further supplement the 
CAC, though it has benefits, was not the best approach assessed. 
The best policy option presented was the least complex.  Though there will 
always be an inherent distrust to any surveillance program, no matter its origin, in 
contrast to established government activities, LE would likely benefit far greater using 
commercial imagery providers.  The relative ease of collecting material with minimal 
obstacles is a clear benefit of its use.  Another obvious advantage, from a legal 
perspective, is its exemption from likely PCA and EO 12333 issues.  Option 3: Make 
Greater use of Commercial Providers, had the overall best score as a policy approach to 







VI. CONCLUSION AND LESSONS LEARNED 
The necessity of a satellite surveillance mechanism is apparent. Whether it is used 
in emergency service management, LE operational development support, evidentiary data 
collection, or a host of other current and future uses, its efficacy is obvious.  The 
incorporation of satellite imagery collection, if it is not already being conducted, is a vital 
segment of LE situational awareness.  The design and purpose of this thesis was to 
answer the following research questions: 
1. In coordination with the military and intelligence community, as well as 
other government agencies, is there a mechanism that can provide LE with 
greater access to national asset products, or a suitable alternative in the 
form of commercial providers?  
2. Can this activity be conducted while adhering to and addressing 
constitutional law and likely privacy concerns?   
3. Is there a mechanism or approach for assuaging the American public’s to 
this type of surveillance; would a level of transparency work? 
A. LE ACCESS TO IMAGERY RESOURCES 
This thesis explored three policy options and ranked them against a specific 
grading criterion to draw a comparison in relationship to 1) likely legislative support, 2) 
key legal issues, 3) cost, and 4) ease to implement.  The main purpose of this analysis, 
presented in Section 5, was to provide an assessment on the policy’s viability relating to 
both program implementation and likely LE support. 
1. The CAC and LE 
As its stands, the CAC provides useful mapping and imagery via the USGS 
National Map Downloader and Viewer that can be read and incorporated into multiple 
GIS packages in addition to the proprietary software of the USGS.  The GFP may be 
useful from the perspective of providing an additional source of data; however, the 
imagery delivered is geared more towards earth science studies and will likely provide 
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less relevant information than the National Map.  The CAC has the in-house capability to 
provide greater support to LE in addition to the emergency services support they 
currently provide; however, the CAC is not in a position to provide direct assistance in 
criminal investigation.  Imagery interpretation and analysis is a tasking that could likely 
provide significant subject matter expertise.  Another potential flaw in the option is the 
inability for the USGS to update its mapping and imagery data; the National Map though 
useful, does not have an established mechanism to readily update data.  The National 
States Geographic Information Council’s, Imagery for the Nation proposal would have 
provided updated aerial and imagery data for 10 years, but it came with such a high price 
tag that was unattainable in an era of lean federal funding. 
2. The NAO, LE, and Public Opinion 
The NAO was a program full of good intensions that from the very start would 
likely never deliver to its principle customer: LE at the micro level.  The fact that the 
NAO even got a start and existed, even for a short time, paints a picture of 
overconfidence in a program that was somewhat infallible from a legislative and public 
point of view.   
From the very beginning, the office did a poor job of offering any program 
transparency; it took the media and congressional hearings to actually shed light on much 
of the activities existence.  While there may be a certain acceptance to corporate intrusion 
into individual privacy, it is unfortunately the cost or circumstance in conducting any 
form of business. It does not hold true when the government is the monitor, surreptitious 
or not.  Though most Americans can understand the utility of some surveillance 
programs, there is a justified distrust of the organization conducting the activity, the 
legality of the collection effort, and how the material is going to be used.   Similar 
between the United States and other countries, both are quite content when the 
surveillance caught violator is an institution; as far as both are concerned, groups that 
push the envelope of established laws for the pure purpose of profit, deserve to be caught 
and fined to the maximum extent.  However, there is an apparent difference when the 
target is an individual as opposed to a group.  From an American perspective, even basic 
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surveillance monitoring of an individual is still perceived as extremely questionable 
because of civil liberty and privacy concerns.  Passive, active, or blanket shadowing 
against one’s privacy is simply not accepted by most Americans, whether it is justified or 
not; no matter the motive or purpose most will question its intention and overall 
justification. 
3. Commercial Providers 
Though the NAO and CAC presented a somewhat seal of government acceptance 
and access to the best imagery systems available, as it relates to both legal scrutiny, being 
exempt from PCA and EO 12333, and having ready access, commercial providers are the 
best option for LE.  . 
The public is going to always question the intension and purpose of any 
surveillance program.  When the discussion is presented to the public with regards to 
such activity, at best the response is either lukewarm to completely negative; the 
trepidation is justified.  Most individuals will deal with a CCTV in a public area; the 
camera is in plain sight and the only real angst may entail where their image eventually 
ends up and its future use.  However, when using a tool that is out of the public eye, for 
example signals or satellite collection, the specter of government intrusion grows 
exponentially.  
As of today, police activities do not have the ability to call up an imagery satellite, 
like a CCTV, and begin to collect real-time data on a potential criminal.222  At the very 
minimum, what local jurisdiction has are the same mapping and imagery web services 
that the general public has access to or better.  In addition to finding building code 
violators,223 local LE will likely use these tools to prepare emergency plans for high 
profile activities within its jurisdictions.  These facilities would include schools, public 
buildings, populated venues, and other areas of interest.  As LE technology and 
capabilities improve, this will likely change to provide a better incident real-time picture. 
222 This will likely change when more police activities acquire their own UAS capability. 
223 Eric Jaffe, “Code Enforcement Goes High-Tech, The Atlantic Cities, March 7, 2013, accessed 
August 21, 2013, http://www.theatlanticcities.com/technology/2013/03/code-enforcement-goes-high-
tech/4899/. 
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The local citizenry will always be untrusting of a faceless monitoring activity; this 
is not to say that the same public maintains an unconditional non-acceptance across the 
board.  However, the public though skeptical of any surveillance apparatus no matter who 
is collecting or using it, may gain a level of acceptance if LE is transparent on the 
potential use, benefits to the community, and success. 
B. ADHERENCE TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
The Fourth Amendment is the cornerstone of all laws relating to individual 
privacy.  The edict as it was originally prepared is an inherently noncomplex legal tenet 
made up of 54 words that talks about the legal conduct of searches, seizures, and the 
issuance of lawful warrants; it does not contain one word on “privacy” or “civil rights.”  
Since the Fourth’s ratification,224 the amendment has been challenged in a conventional 
sense and modified, or retooled, to take into consideration realistic expectations of 
privacy as well as advancements in available technology.  LE activities can be conducted 
well within the constitutional guidelines in the twenty first century; the Fourth gets 
retooled, as a result of judicial decision, in parallel to the law and time. 
1. Retooling the Fourth Amendment 
Section 4 of this thesis discussed Olmstead v. United States where the use of 
advanced technology, in this case wiretapping, was used against Roy Olmstead and 
challenged.  In 1928, the courts determined that since the investigators did not remove 
any “tangible material effects” or conduct in any “physical invasion” that a search did not 
occur under the Fourth Amendment; Olmstead lost his case.   
Almost 40 years later in Katz v. United States, though the evidentiary collection 
method was the same as Olmstead, the courts ruled differently.  When Charles Katz was 
conducting an illegal betting operation in an enclosed phone booth, that happened to be 
wiretapped, he contended that his individual privacy was an extension of Fourth 
Amendment protection.  In 1967, the courts determined, in contrast to the 1928  
 
224 The Fourth Amendment, which is part of the Bill of Rights, was ratified on December 15, 1791. 
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interpretation, that an individual’s privacy played a role in a Fourth Amendment search; 
they determined that the law was applicable to individuals and not particular places. Katz 
won his case. 
When comparing Olmstead and Katz, in 1928 Olmstead the line was drawn at the 
“place,” in 1967, the Katz case ruling redrew the line to the “person.”  With this new, or 
reinterpreted, metric, the courts established a set privacy standards that know test Fourth 
Amendment compliance where 1) the person must have an expectation of privacy, and 2) 
the expectation must be reasonable.  
2. Expectation to Reasonable Privacy and the Public Place 
More often than not, an individual’s expectation to reasonable privacy is at odds 
with his or her specific location.  If Charles Katz was conducting his enterprise on a 
crowded subway, with his fellow passenger listening in, would he have been accorded 
that same verdict?  The same can be said with regards to the sliding scale of privacy; the 
shifting of a surveillance covey to determine a search from a non-search as it relates to a 
constitutional perspective.  
The use of conducting a search within an environment where the public has 
access can radically change the definition of a search.225  For example, California v. 
Ciraolo, Dow Chemical Corporation v. United States, and Florida v. Riley were all cases 
where the sliding scale of privacy was apparent with regards to the definition of a search.  
If the principle evidence for Dante Ciraolo, Dow Chemical, or Michael Riley was 
collected at ground level, behind a fence line, and without a warrant, the ruling of each of 
their cases would have been in favor of them because of constitutional noncompliance.  
What made the difference in all three cases was the ability to manage the collection effort 
from nonpublic to a public area. In these cases, the collection area was shifted from the 
ground, behind a fence, to an area that the common citizen has free access—public 
airspace where aerial surveillance was properly conducted and admissible in the courts. 
225 Most police activities would likely have a warrant already in place. 
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A question that is being presented in legal proceedings today regarding public 
imagery is: if the public has access to it, is it fair game to not call it a search?  If the end 
user knows the imagery information is historical and can only be useful in producing 
evidential generalities, as long as it is being used in the framework of an open or public 
space environment, can this be construed as a virtual public airspace open to all and 
constitutionally above board? 
C. ASSUAGING THE PUBLIC 
Often it is interpreted in many circles that “transparency” is an ugly word; any 
release seems to come with great resistance from the owner.  Often, when information is 
declassified it is either because the data itself is so old to matter or a leak from a source 
other than the principle processor occurred.  One area where the system fails in is 
perpetuating a continuous culture of secrecy; basically any surveillance product 
generated, no matter how benign, is immediately slapped with classified stamp.  In the 
public’s eye, it is just hard to trust an institution that relentlessly and unconditionally 
keeps secrets. 
1. Transparency as a Solution 
Lack of transparency, in of itself, may be necessary to avoid compromising an 
investigation or surveillance trade craft.  However, the blanket exclusion of providing 
even a token explanation of the material collected, its justification, purpose, and policy 
draws a societal mistrust of the system as a whole.  And that distrust increases when an 
additional unknown program is discovered rather than preemptively discussed up front. 
Progressive LE activities makes a point to show how criminals are caught in the 
neighborhood, often by exhibiting surveillance material to the members of the 
community which they are policing; this is presented by the media on a daily basis for the 
viewer to see and often to indirectly assist in the investigation.  From one perspective, LE 
is showing that its systems are working by putting known criminals in jail and the second 
is forewarning potential wrongdoers that they are being watched and will be the next 
individual arrested. This is an improvised method of frontloading legal compliance by  
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introducing a healthy fear of getting caught.  On the other hand, if the local citizenry feels 
that individual privacy is being unduly infringed upon, a local police chief is often 
extremely accessible.  
D. LEARNING FROM OTHERS TO EXPLORE AND IMPLEMENT A 
NOTIONAL APPROACH 
Local LE will manage its GIS requirements commensurate to the requirements of 
individual jurisdictions. It not going to wait for a national mandate—this is a good 
approach.  However, should further examination be conducted on how other country’s LE 
activities conduct satellite surveillance as an investigative tool?  Though the 
interpretation and sensitivity to individual privacy may be vast, can a common ground be 
found? 
When coupling the understanding of privacy from a domestic to an international 
standpoint, more often than not the United States is a minority when it comes to being 
perceived as hyper-sensitive to privacy.  In comparing a similar international equal, 
Australia is in a somewhat different situation, where, according to the Australian Law 
Reform Commission, “the recognition of a general right to privacy warranting legal 
protection is a relatively modern phenomenon.”226  Though they follow the tenets of both 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Civil Covenant of 
Political Rights and European Convention of Human Rights, in comparison to United 
States law, privacy laws are inherently new to Australian jurisprudence.   
Minimal case studies are available regarding the use of imagery satellites against 
felony-based crimes, but that is not to say is does not occur.  However, a classic study of 
where this form of advanced surveillance occurs, at the individual level, is in the arena of 
environmental compliance, principally the law breaking Australian farmer or property 
owner. 
Though still Australia somewhat learning the specifics of privacy laws, in 
comparison to the United States as of 2010, 53 trials have been conducted within the 
226 Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice 
(ALRC Report 108) (Sydney: Australian Law Reform Commission, 2008), section 1.33.  
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Australian court system where satellite imagery was key evidence.227  In Australia, if 
satellite photo interpretation has determined that unregulated land clearing, against an 
individual, has or is occurring, direct legal action can be pursued; an activity with which 
the U.S. legal system is inherently not acquainted. 
Satellite imagery collection was initially used as an analysis tool to monitor 
landscape health as a means to establish and bolster policy decisions on land resource 
management; it was later determined that policy was often ignored.228  The next option 
was to take this technology and integrate it into a surveillance monitoring methodology 
that could be readily integrated in a court of law.229   
Despite the early hurdles, Australian magistrates are grasping the technology, 
utility, and practicality of satellite imagery in their courts.  The ability to see a picture 
objectively, followed up with witness testimony, enhances the integrity of court 
proceeding.  However, as in every case of introducing new methods, especially in the 
legal system, prosecutors, technicians, and investigators had to learn how to break new 
ground using this type of data in a court of law on a regular basis.  A key to success was 
the ability for all three groups to work together in properly establishing a chain of 
evidence230 that could be legally introduced in a court of law. 
Ironically, when Australian farmers were surveyed on the notion of their 
properties being monitored by satellite for ensuring environmental compliance, the 
majority were either neutral to highly in favor to such monitoring.  The key to acceptance 
227 Ray Purdy, Satelllite Monitoring of Environmental Laws, Lessons to be Learnt from Australia 
(London: Centre for Law and the Environment, Faculty of Laws, University College London Centre for 
Law and the Environment Research, 2010), 189–206. 
228 Robyn L. Bartel,”Satellite Imagery and Land Clearance Legislation: A Picture of Regulatory 
Efficacy?” The Australian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 9, no 1, (2004): 1–31. 
229 Robyn L. Bartel and Joseph H. Leach,”Big Brother and the Law of the Land: The Role of Satellite 
Surveillance and GIS in the Regulation of Land Clearance,” in Proceedings of the Spacial Information 
Research Centre’s 12th Colloquium (SIRC2000), University of Otago, New Zealand, 2000, 267–277. 
230 The National Institute of Standards and Technology, Australian Standards and New Zealand 
Standards, or AS/NZS Standards, and the British Standards Institution provide guidance on digital imagery 
and its use in the legal system. 
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of the monitoring program was transparency, active communications with regulators, and 
having access to the imagery itself. 231 
E. WHAT WORKS 
Key elements that are working in Australia’s favor is 1) starting small, 2) 
concentrating its current effort towards environmental violators, and 3) making the 
surveillance program transparent.  There exist, within the United States similar options 
that can be explored where lessons learned have been acquired.  Recommendations 
would include: 
1. Being realistic: With the exception of high profile natural and manmade
disasters, the likelihood of supplemental funding or assistance from the
federal government for imagery support for LE, outside what is already
available, is unlikely.  It will be up to the individual jurisdictions to set up
their own capability.
2. Starting small: Establish an imagery database of the jurisdiction being
managed.  Make it a point to collect imagery on high profile activities and
start generating notional emergency operations plans using that data and
ensure that the plans are updated on a regular basis.  Additionally, make
certain the community knows this activity is being conducted to protect
the citizenry.
3. Use in court: Unless data is extremely current and documented the best it
can provide is a historical timeline; that is not to say that it cannot still be
used as supplemental evidence.  With regards to public acceptance in the
courts, laws against the environment are a topic where the American
citizenry can rally around; as a whole, pollution violators impact the
community.  The use of imagery against groups or individuals, who
inherently are against the community, will establish a public acceptance to
this form of evidence collection.
231 Purdy, Satellite Monitoring of Environmental Laws, 119. 
95 
4. Establish legal guidelines: There are guidelines readily established for the
introduction of digital photography in a court of law;232 further extending
those same guidelines, including satellite imagery, will be beneficial.
5. Establish and maintain talent: Establish and maintain a talent pool inside
and outside of the organization that can manage, analyze, and ultimately
present data in a court of law.
6. Commercial assets: Make greater use of commercial satellite providers to
either supplement or replace government resources.
7. Transparency: Make the LE use of satellite imagery transparent.
8. Results: Openly show the results of imagery evidence and how it
convicted the guilty party.
9. Publish: Make it a point to publish and share GIS capability and
methodology with colleagues.
Satellite imagery has proven that it is an essential tool to many activities; the 
military planner, disaster managers, LE, and the common citizen.  It is being used for a 
vast array of purposes.  Aerial and UAS technology, as it relates to the law, is being 
written and perpetually updated. The evidence it produces for the courts is an obvious 
signal that the regular use of more advanced surveillance tools are on the horizon. 
Frontloading key considerations for the justified use and the public’s sensitivity to 
privacy will make for a less turbulent satellite based collection program. 
232 National Institute of Justice, Uniteed States Department of Justice, Forensic Examination of 
Digital Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement (NCJ 199408) (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 
2004). 
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